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INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty years, section 1983' has become a mainstay for
civil rights litigation in federal court.2 Most state courts also entertain
section 1983 actions. However, the United States Supreme Court paid little
attention to the statute's role in state litigation until its decision in Will v.
Michigan Department of State Police.4 The most significant feature of Will
was the extent to which it patterned the availability of section 1983 relief
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 was originally enacted as 'part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. See infra note 13 (quoting from the text of § 1983).
2. Literature on this statute and its significance in civil rights litigation is extensive. See,
e.g., Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of
Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1989); Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482 (1982); Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional
Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MIcH. L. Rav. 82 (1989); McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983, 60 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1974); Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and
Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REv. 997 (1990); Nichol, Federalism, State
Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959 (1987); Section 1983: The Constitution and the
Courts, 77 GEo. L.J. 1437 (1989) (a symposium with contributions by Abernathy, Collins,
Eisenberg, Lopez, Nahmod and Schuck); Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement
of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1982); Zagrans, "Under Color of " What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499 (1985); Comment,
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAgv. L. REv. 1133 (1977). For
ongoing surveys of section 1983 litigation see S. NAHMOD, CIvIL RIGHTS AND CIvIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1990), and M. ScHwarz & J.
KIRKLiN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAims, DEFENSES, AND FEES (1986 & Supp. 1989).
3. E.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); cf. S. STmNGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
IN STATE CouRTS 1-3 (1989) ("Appellate decisions in virtually every state expressly or by
implication permit their trial courts to exercise jurisdiction over § 1983 actions, and there are
no longer any state court systems that refuse to hear § 1983 cases."). See generally Herman,
Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1057 (1989); Note,
Clarifying Comity: State Court Jurisdiction and Section 1983 State Tax Challenges, 103 HARv.
L. REv. 1888, 1895-1902 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Clarifying Comity].
4. "109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). Will alleged that he was denied a particular state civil service
position as a result of political information about his brother contained in a "red squad" file.
Since Will had subsequently obtained a comparable position, his § 1983 suit was for damages
only (lost wages, career loss, emotional distress and exemplary damages). Will v. Department
of Civil Serv., 145 Mich. App. 214, 217-18, 377 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1985). The Michigan
Supreme Court held that neither the state departments nor their directing officers were
"persons" within § 1983. Will, 428 Mich. 540, 553-89, 410 N.W.2d 749, 754-70 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court affirmed. Will, 109 S. Ct. 2304. For an extended discussion of
the facts of the case and its history in the Michigan courts, see Burnham & Fayz, The State
as a Section 1983 "Non-Person" Some Comments on the Will Case and Some Suggestions
for the Future, 70 OR. L. REv. - (1991) (forthcoming).
[Vol. 66:1
1990] PRAGMATISM AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3
in state court on the more established federal court model, even though
eleventh amendment law which had shaped that model did not apply to
state proceedings.
Will is an important case, and one that invites speculation about the
amount of symmetry appropriate between state and federal civil rights
litigation under section 1983. It is regrettable that the Will opinions throw
so little light on these matters. In a sadly familiar pattern, a bare majority
shrugged off the challenges of a shrill dissent.6
But cause for dissatisfaction with Will runs deeper than style. Even if
one attributes qualities of a dialogue7 to the exchange between the majority
and the dissent, that dialogue may have been unproductive. This Article
discusses why and suggests an alternative approach to the problem in Will
over the meaning of section 1983.
The first part of this Article examines the function and jurisprudential
roots of non-pragmatist approaches to the statutory interpretation issue in
Will. Neither the approach of the Will majority nor that of the dissent
created the possibility of a reasoned application of section 1983, because
both positions rested on "political" interpretations of section 1983. The
problem was not that the Justices misused conventional approaches to
statutory interpretation. Of those approaches-which I will describe as
intentionalism, plain meaning and political interpretation-it was predictable
that only the last would be of real use in Will. Yet in Will and other cases,
where plain meaning and intentionalism prove sterile, it is particularly useful
to ask whether legal pragmatism might serve as an additional approach to
statutory interpretation. If it can, the Justices will have more than politics
left to talk about. They will also have pragmatism to shape the content and
enhance the stature of their decisions. In the second part of this Article, I
attempt to develop this idea and to demonstrate how it could have been
applied in Will.
I suggest that legal pragmatism does not indicate a different result in
Will because the approach seems to support the majority's reading of section
1983. However, the Court could have enlisted legal pragmatism to clarify
the issue in Will, to make the decision more acceptable and to inform the
legal community more fully about comparative access in state and federal
civil rights litigation. The example offered by Will suggests how pragmatism
5. Justice White wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
6. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also filed a separate
opinion. Id. at 2320 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. On the apparent decline of constructive discourse within the Supreme Court, see Revesz
& Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1067, 1067 (1988)
(noting the growing polarization of the voting patterns of the Court and the increasing number
of separate dissents).
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may either provide a separate justification for the result favored under one
of two conflicting nonpragmatist theories or may lessen the conflict itself
by suggesting less real difference when the theories are actually applied.
This Article offers an expansive and optimistic vision of legal pragmatism.
Comparisons between pragmatist and nonpragmatist theory are necessary
to this approach, both to determine what sets legal pragmatism apart and
to demonstrate how pragmatism might interact productively with nonprag-
matist sources. Part of this multidimensional focus will be on convergences
within and between three levels: approaches to statutory interpretation noted
above; traditions of positivism, natural law and historical jurisprudence;
and the politics of federal rights, federal courts and federalism. Those
working within these levels have produced rich and quite extensive schol-
arship. I am indebted to them, and threads to broad-spectrum discussion
within each of the three levels may be found in the notes that follow. At
the same time, this Article breaks with tradition by dealing more with the
intersection of these matters than with the matters themselves. This seems
necessary to my objective; yet, I apologize to readers pained to find natural
law, federalism or some other subject dear to them treated in only a few
pages.
Two other aspects of the approach taken here may also throw some off
balance. First, pragmatism is of paramount importance to this Article, yet
readers will not encounter a discussion of pragmatist legal theory until
midway. The delay stems from my view of legal pragmatism as a positive,
interactive force within a larger community of nonpragmatist thought and
the judgment that it might be useful first to establish at least the outlines
of that larger community. Second, this Article may to some readers seem
to be neither fish nor fowl. I will at times discuss Will with a particularity
characteristic of articles based upon a single case. However, I will also use
Will as a vehicle for much more theoretical discussion. Viewed only as an
exegesis of the case, the Article may seem top heavy. Viewed as a broader
exercise in legal theory, it may seem restricted by details about Will and its
immediate environment. Yet recognition of the interplay of theory and
application so important to legal pragmatism warrants the attempt in this
Article to integrate both forms of inquiry.
I. THE WLL CAsE
Having filed in state court, Ray Will did not have to worry about the
eleventh amendment bar to section 1983 actions against states in federal
court.' Will lost anyway, because the Court interpreted section 1983 in a
manner which replicated eleventh amendment doctrine.
8. The inapplicability of the eleventh amendment to state proceedings was settled prior
to Will. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980); Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and
the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional
Violations, 69 CAuv. L. REv. 189, 236 (1981).
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The Will Court did not draw from exclusively eleventh amendment sources
and it noted that "the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of
section 1983" were "separate issues." 9 Yet Will referred to the eleventh
amendment repeatedly; cases that the eleventh amendment would have
barred in federal court were also excluded from section 1983 actions. The
Court stated that "Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity-and so to alter the Federal-State
balance in that respect ... ."o The Court then reasoned:
Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to
provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did
not provide such a federal forum for civil rights claims against States,
we cannot accept petitioner's argument that Congress intended never-
theless to create a cause of action against States to be brought in state
courts .... 1
Will preserved the Court's previous holding in Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York12 that a. municipality was a "person" within
the meaning of section 1983,13 but bolstered its refusal to include states
within the term by reference to the eleventh amendment. 4 The Court turned
again to eleventh amendment doctrine when it excluded from section 1983
coverage damage claims against Michigan state officials acting in their
official capacities. 5
The Supreme Court cloned the benign side of its eleventh amendment
doctrine as well, placing within section 1983 a major category of cases it
had previously protected from the amendment when they arose in federal
court. "Of course[,]" stated the Court, "a State official in his or her
official capacity,' when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under
9. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. CL 2304, 2309 (1989). The court went
on to add, however, that "in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of §
1983 that disregards it." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
13. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected,, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (emphasis added).
14. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311 ("States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while
municipalities are not .... ).
15. Will cited Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), for this point. Will, 109 S. Ct.
at 2311. In Graham, the Court held that the eleventh amendment bars not only federal damage
actions directly against states, but also an "official-capacity action for damages .... " Graham,
473 U.S. at 170.
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§ 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State."1' 1 6 This breach in the wall did not help Will,
who was suing Michigan state departments and (in their official capacity)
the officers directing them for damages. Nor did it mollify the dissent, who
lamented that "the Eleventh Amendment lurks everywhere in today's deci-
sion and, in truth, determines its outcome. ' 1 7
II. WILL AS A POLITICAL DECISION
A. Three Nonpragmatist Approaches to Interpreting Section 1983
1. Intentionalism
In positing their interpretations of section 1983, both the majority and
the dissent emphasized legislative history, offering conflicting answers to
the question of whether placing states within the reach of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 would have comported with Congress' own understanding of
the statute. Ostensibly then, much of the Will debate seems to occur within
the precincts of intentionalism.' 8 The best intentionalist reading of a statute
is not necessarily the most logical, or the one most aligned with any
particular understanding of justice. Instead, the best reading is one which
most fully captures what members of Congress actually thought and intended 9
when they voted a statute into law. Ordinarily, intentionalist arguments
focus on known events leading to passage20 and possibly (as in Will)21 on
data drawn from the larger historical context in which the legislative
enactment took place.
There is a certain affinity between intentionalism and historical jurispru-
dence, an important nineteenth century movement in Germany and
16. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2311 n.10 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14) (citing Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
17. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2312. A unanimous Court recently confirmed that assessment.
Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2437 (1990).
18. On the ultimate failure of intentionalist arguments in Will, see infra notes 93-101 and
accompanying text.
19. Actual intent, as used here, is roughly synonymous with original intent. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & Pun.
POL'y 59, 60 (1988). Proponents focus on how and why particular legislators responsible for
the statute used their authority. "[T]he goal is not to look at a general legislative aim or
purpose, but instead to see more particularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved
the question, or how it intended that question to be resolved, if it had been presented."
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. Rv. 405, 429 (1989).
20. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 429 ("For those who emphasize legislative intent, the
legislative history is a central object of concern.").
21. See infra note 98.
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England.? Historical jurisprudence, while unsympathetic to legislative power,23
has in common with intentionalism a view of history as a constraint on
legal change.2 Intentionalism also resembles historical jurisprudence as a
phenomenon at odds with a modern understanding of history and historical
method in legal theory.2 This is clear when one contrasts the inhibiting
effect particular histories of legislative intent have on legal change with the
opposite, liberating effect history can have by informing a wide range of
policy choices. 26
2.- Plain Meaning and Political Interpretation
Two other perspectives used in modem statutory interpretation at times
complement and at times compete with intentionalism. The first is the plain
meaning rule. The second, which I will term political interpretation, is
manifested when the judiciary collaborates with the legislature in making
political choices. 27
The plain meaning rule, which provides that a statute be interpreted
according to the plain or ordinary meaning of its language, continues to
22. See 1 R. PouND, JURISPRUDENCE 81-87 (1959); Konvitz, Historical School of Jurispru-
dence, in 4 TEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHInOsoPHY 21-22 (1967). The most significant piece of
English scholarship is H.S. MAIN, ANCIENT LAw (1963) (first published in 1861). For
assessments, see Professor Frederick Pollock's introduction to H.S. MAIaN, supra, and L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF TH LAW 79-90 (1968). On the historical jurisprudence movement in the
United States, see Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 CoLum. L.
REv. 681, 693-98 (1951).
23. Pound noted the movement's "distrust of legislation and of creative judicial decision."
I R. POUND, supra note 22, at 85. Maine conceded legislation a role "by which Law is
brought into harmony with society," but subordinated it in that regard to roles performed by
legal fictions and equity. H.S. MaNE, supra note 22, at 24. "The legislature," he wrote,
"whatever be the actual restraints imposed upon it by public opinion, is in theory empowered
to impose what obligations it pleases on the members of the community. There is nothing to
prevent its legislating in the wantonness of caprice." Id. at 28.
24. Historical jurisprudence creates "limitations both on the sovereignty of the lawmaking
power and on the authority of reason and conscience." Berman, Toward an Integrative
Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 779, 780 (1988). Adherents
"argue that what the law 'is' politically and 'ought to be' morally is to be found in the
national character, the culture, and the historical ideals and traditions of the people or society
whose law it is." Id. at 780-81. For a similar description, see D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND 170
(1974).
25. See J. HAL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1973); Powell, Rules for Originalists,
73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987).
26. See, e.g., L. FrimDmAx, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 26-38 (1990). See generally J.W.
Hupsr, THE GROWTH OF AMERI.CAN LAW (1950) (tracing the growth of the American legal
system in relation to historical developments in American society). Not only is this true for
legislatures, but it is true under the right circumstances for courts interpreting statutes. See
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 213, 214 (1983) (describing how judges consult "social and political history" in statutory
interpretation).
27. The metaphor is from Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541 (1988).
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exert influence.2 When plain language suggests how the statute is to be
applied, giving it that application is often thought to comport with actual
legislative intent, since the legislature chose the words. In reality, the
language discloses only manifest intent29-which may or may not reflect
actual legislative intent.30 Yet "despite this, there is no practical alternative
to assuming that the manifest intent is the actual intent, until new appro-
priate evidence is available or the legislature enacts a corrective amend-
ment.""1 Plain meaning occasionally contradicts demonstrable legislative
intent. Some have suggested that sufficiently clear statutory language should
triumph even in such cases.32 Overall, the plain meaning rule has its critics,3
but seems to be enjoying a rise in popularity.3 4
A political model legitimates approaches to statutory interpretation which
bring judges' own substantive values into play. Commentators favoring this
approach do not discard possibilities for statutory interpretation through
plain meaning or evidence of actual legislative intent. However, they en-
courage courts to entertain additional inquiries in what the writers (some-
times differently) conceive to be the right circumstances.35
28. The term textualism describes an approach close to (if not identical with) that undertaken
under the plain meaning rule. For extended discussion of the former, see Eskridge, The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
29. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATTEs 69 (1975).
30. "The meaning of words is not the same as the 'intent' of the, writers. Often writers
have no pertinent intent or have several intents." Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the
Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 87, 87 (1984).
31. R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 85.
32. E.g., Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 534 (1983). Plain
meaning advocates, according to Professor Johnstone, "argue that legislative history materials
should not be resorted to in statutory interpretation cases if the language of the statute is
clear on its face. A corollary of this position is that legislative history materials should not
be used to show ambiguity of a statute plain on its face." Johnstone, An Evaluation of the
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 KAN. L. REv. 1, 7 (1954). One commentator recently has
offered examples where the "Court has applied the plain-meaning standard even when it has
produced harsh results that the drafters and adopters of a particular statute did not intend."
Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx.
L. REv. 745, 747-49 (1990). Justice Scalia appears to be at the forefront of the plain meaning
movement. Cf. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1087, 1151 (comparing plain meaning arguments in Justice
Scalia's opinions with Justice Stevens' insistence that demonstrations of legislative intent should
control). For extended discussion of Justice Scalia's position, see Eskridge, supra note 28.
"Justice Scalia's approach, if adopted, would represent a significant change in the way the
Court writes its statutory interpretation decisions, and probably even the way the Court
conceptualizes its role in interpreting statutes." Id. at 624.
33. E.g., Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 1299 (1975). The plain
meaning approach came under particularly strong attack in the first half of this century.
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MINtC. L. Rav. 20, 27 (1988).
34. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2279 (1989) (where the Supreme
Court declared that its interpretation of a federal statute was supported by a "cascade of
plain language").
35. See, e.g., G. CAI.AREsI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTEs (1982); Aleiikoff,
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The play of political values in statutory interpretation may be perceptible
even in an intentionalist setting, where judges ask either what the enacting
legislature intended or how that particular group would have answered
other, related questions? 6 The field of inquiry for such questions may be
vast, and data 'found there may be cryptic or incomplete. Therefore, judges
will be tempted (perhaps required) to draw upon their own political sensi-
bilities to complete the inquiry. The endeavor can be seen as reconstructing
the atmosphere of enactment in order to achieve a larger conception of
legislative intent. The process, variously described as a search within an
ever-widening context, 37 a search for statutory purpose38 or a search to
discover the equity of the statute, 39 can quickly lead to bolder inquiries
which courts may or may not acknowledge-those seeking meaning from a
statute which the most informed and enlightened legislature of that time
would have wished for it, or which those informed by experience and
modem values would give to it.40 In its most radical form, this approach
supra note 33; Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987);
Langvoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts
in Federal Banking Regulation, 82 MicH. L. Rnv. 672 (1987); Macy, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM.
L. Rav. 223 (1986); Popkin, supra note 27; Sunstein, supra note 19; Note, A Norm-Based
Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185 (1986).
36. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37. According to one scholar:
Context is an open-ended concept that includes an ever-widening circle of ma-
terial-the shared conceptions of how particular words are used at the time a
statute is passed, the historical mischief animating (or prompting) the passage of
a law, legislative intent to solve a specific problem, more general purposes
underlying the statute, and finally, the background considerations (such as
traditional social and political values) affecting the legislature's action.
Popkin, supra note 32, at 1139; see also H. HART & A. SACKS, Tm LEoAL PROCESS: BAsic
PRoBTEMs IN TnE MAKmG AND APPUcATION OF LAw 1415-16 (tent. ed. 1958); cf. Horack, The
Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 341 (1949) (Ultimately, "legislative
intention becomes not what the legislature in fact intended but rather what reliable evidences
there are to satisfy the need for further understanding of the legislative action.").
38. It is important here to note the difference between legislative "purpose" and actual
legislative intent. "[T]he word 'intent' coincides with the particular immediate purpose that
the statute is intended to directly express and immediately accomplish, whereas the word
'purpose' refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to
accomplish or help to accomplish." R. DicKERSoN, supra note 29, at -88; see also Weisberg,
supra note 26. What ulterior purpose (if any) the legislature might wish to serve by enacting
a particular statute is an amorphous question, Sunstein, supra note 19, at 426-28, usually more
difficult to'answer than the question of actual legislative intent. R. DIcKERSON, supra note 29,
at 90. A search for ulterior purpose may in fact downplay indicia of actual intent, H. HART
& A. SACKS, supra note 37, at 1416, focusing instead on more global considerations such as
prior and contemporaneous law or simply "general public knowledge of what was considered
to be the mischief that needed remedying." Id. at 1415.
39. For examination of this maxim, see Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A
Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDozo L. RPv. 799 (1985).
40. "For the individual justice to be left so much at large presents opportunity and
temptation to adopt interpretations that fit his predilections as to what he would like the
statute to mean if he were a legislator." Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress
Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 537 (1948).
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to statutory interpretation has been described as one permitting courts to
police legislatures, "to ensure that legislation reflects public values, rather
than simply producing benefits for special interest groups .... [L]egislation
would be restricted to a specific set of judicially identified goals chosen
because they embrace civic virtue." '4'
B. Jurisprudential Affinities
It is not always possible to separate intentionalism from perspectives of
plain meaning or political interpretation. 42 When conceived as distinct,
intentionalism still seems a formidable, perhaps dominant perspective.43 On
the strength of its jurisprudential credentials, intentionalism is an unlikely
winner. The attitude of historical jurisprudence it seems in part to reflect"
is generally out of favor.45 In contrast, the plain meaning and political
models suggest affinities with analytical positivism and natural law, respec-
tively-two movements now more important. It will be impossible here to
do more than sketch outlines of these movements, 46 but that much will be
useful to this Article.
41. Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 908
(1987).
42. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
43. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 321, 325 (1990) ("The most popular grand theory is probably intentionalism.").
44. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
45. One commentator has suggested that "[h]istorical jurisprudence never did gain much
of a foothold in America." R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 35
(1982). While the movement had been significant in England, it was losing force there by the
turn of the century:
Perhaps the greatness of historical jurisprudence lay in the fact that it provided
its own seed of dissolution; for once it is admitted that law is historically
conditioned, it is as impossible to limit the conception of law to a Volksgeist as
to the commands of the sovereign; all forms of social control and all sources of
law emerge as subjects for legitimate consideration and study.
Konvitz, supra note 22, at 22.
At the same time, the influence of historical jurisprudence in American law is not confined
to the actual-intent approach to statutory interpretation. For example, the present standard
for determining whether a federal civil case is one for which the seventh amendment of the
United States Constitution confers a right to a jury trial is whether the case is (or sufficiently
resembles) one for which a right to a jury would have existed at English common law in 1791.
Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987); see also Henderson, The Background of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 HAiv. L. REv. 289 (1966).
46. For a more extensive introduction than is possible here, see D. RicARnas, THE MoRAL
CRmCIsM OF LAW 7-38 (1977). Analytical positivism and natural law are enormous topics.
Scholarship has spanned a great many subjects, including debate over true and deviant meanings
of the concepts and about whether the two are entirely distinct. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 253 (1961); N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AN LEGAL THEORY 59-62 (1978);
Berman, supra note 24, at 782-88; Fiss, Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE L.J. 1007 (1981).
Structure useful for framing such issues can be found in G. Clmusrm, LAW, NORMs AND
AUTHORITY (1982).
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. Important analytical positivists47 were English writers Jeremy Bentham s
and John Austin.49 American John Chipman Gray was influenced by their
work.50 The movement contributed significantly to American legal thought,
although it never attained in America the dominant position that it continues
to have in England.5 ' The most important English theorist of this century
is H.L.A. Hart,5 2 whose positivism is more sophisticated and conciliatory
in tone.53 The movement appears to be enjoying a resurgence as a significant,
contending voice in American jurisprudence. Positivist sympathies are evi-
dent in views giving special importance to statutory text in isolation, 4 or
to constitutional text in isolation.55
Analytical positivists were so named for their emphasis on the posited or
enclosed character of law. "Positive law, so conceived, is a 'pure' fact;
that is, a body of data that can be isolated from data of all other kinds
and studied on its own terms, quite apart from any consideration of its
47. Sometimes "legal positivism" is used to denote what I intend here by the term
"analytical positivism." E.g., D. RICHARDS, supra note 46, at 16-22. I prefer the latter because
it risks less confusion with what I will later introduce as pragmatist theory. See infra notes
190-95 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., J. BENTAM, A Fragment on Government, in I Tnm WORKS OF JEREmy
BENTHAM 221-95 (1962) (Bowring ed. 1838-1843); Hart, Bentham, Lecture on a Master Mind,
in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 18-42 (R. Summers ed. 1971).
49. E.g., J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1861); J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF TE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (Hart introd.
1954) (first published as J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832),
and J. AUSTrIN, THE UsEs OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1863)); Rumble, The Legal
Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 986 (1981).
50. J.C. GRAY, Tim NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909). On Gray's work and
influence, see Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in 20th Century America: Major
Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 446-48 (1986); MaeCormick, A Political
Frontier of Jurisprudence: John Chipman Gray on the State, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (1981).
51. P. ATrnAr & R. SumMRs, FoRm AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 243-49
(1987).
52. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 46; H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PmxosoPHY (1983). Hans Kelsen, another important positivist, wrote and taught extensively in
Europe before settling in this country. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATES
(1945). For impressions of his work and influence, see the extensive discussion of Kelsen in
H.L.A. HART, supra note 46. See also Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 UCLA L. REv. 709 (1963);
LAw, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS KELSEN (S. Engel
ed. 1964).
53. However, "Hart continued the positivist tradition of insisting that there is no conceptual
link between law and morals." P. ATrYA & R. SumwmRs, supra note 51, at 260. That provoked
lively controversy. Compare Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958) with Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958).
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. For examples, see the work of Frederick Schauer, Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509 (1988); Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985); Schauer, An Essay on
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982).
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causes, purpose, history, or value." ' A sense of the strong affinity between
positivist jurisprudence and a plain meaning interpretive approach can be
gained from the observations of Professors Atiyah and Summers in their
study of the development of analytical positivism in England.17 Law to
analytical positivists was that "commanded by the sovereign," not "some-
thing to be identified by reference to its substantive content, let alone the
dictates of reason, or appeals to the law of nature or the law of God.''"
Moreover, "the essential and overwhelmingly predominant form of law
consisted of rules, preferably ... statutory rules.''59 Finally, such a scheme
determined the role of the judge because "the sole function of a court
applying the law was to find the sovereign's commands, the underlying
reasons behind those commands could arguably be said to be immaterial." 6
This paradigm of a mechanical form of textual interpretation explains those
strict applications of the plain meaning rule when invoked to override
arguably contrary legislative intent.6'
Natural law concepts found expression in the writings of Aristotle, Cicero
and Thomas Aquinas, among others. 62 Natural law flowered in eighteenth
century Europe,63 and is thought to have had an important influence on
the shape of the United States Constitution and on evolving American legal
theory in general. 4 Natural law themes remained important in American
legal thought throughout much of the nineteenth century, 65 then waned with
the ascendence of formalism." In large part through the influence of Lon
56. Feinberg, Analytic Jurisprudence, in I Ta ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PIosoPHY 109 (1967);
see also Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law, 1989 Wis. L. RE.
669, 670 ("The central focus of the positivist theory is the conception of law as a system of
rules.... In form, these rules are general and impersonal. Justice depends on their application
by the judiciary in a consistent and objective manner, without regard to bias, case-specific
notions of fairness, or other 'extra-legal' considerations."). See generally S. SHUMIAN, LEGAL
PosrrvsM (1963).
57. P. ATrYAH & R. Sumzris, FORM AND SunSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987).
58. Id. at 240-41.
59. Id. at 241. Statutes (and hence their texts) thus become a significant means by which
analytical positivists can conceptualize sovereign authority. See infra text accompanying note
194.
60. P. ATYAH & R. SUrmaRs, supra note 51, at 241.
61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Golding, History of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHnIosoPHY 254, 255-58 (1967).
63. C. BECKER, Tan HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932).
The great eighteenth century English writer Blackstone is usually placed in the natural law
camp, although his views have proven particularly difficult to sort out. For one attempt, see
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALo L. REv. 209 (1979).
64. P. ATIYAH & R. Summnas, supra note 51, at 229-39; M. WrTE, Tan PHILosoPHY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 843 (1978).
65. See G. GILMO E, Tan AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 19-40 (1977); J. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE:
THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES DOE (1967).
66. G. GLMoRE, supra note 65, at 12; P. ATrYAH & R. SUm MRS, supra note 51, at 245-
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Fuller, 67 natural law reemerged as a viable jurisprudential movement and
remains so today.68 Despite differences, what unites natural law theorists
and most clearly distinguishes them from others is that they "have concen-
trated on notions of the 'right' and the 'good' to be realized through law.' '69
Because they read a statute with sensitivity to the rightness of the decision,
judges using a political model of interpretation demonstrate an affinity with
natural law. Part of the value of the political model may be that it simply
reveals and guides authority judges use even when they purport to adhere
to actual intent or plain meaning.70 Yet commentators advancing a political
model clearly go further and press the idea that judges cannot apply statutes
free of a certain moral obligation. Judges must when necessary collaborate
with legislators in determining what types of individuals or groups will be
affected by the statute. In the words of Professor Popkin, "law is the result
of public deliberation about political values in which courts play an active
normative role." 7'
C. A Community of Approaches
At the level of pure theory, analytical positivism and natural law seem
to offer entirely separate (and potentially hostile) conceptions of legal
justification. This is evident from the fact that each defines itself in
significant part by stressing that it is not the other.7 2 The plain meaning
rule and political models, while suggestive of analytical positivism and
natural law respectively, do not appear to generate as much tension in
statutory interpretation opinions or literature. Perhaps this is from reluctance
to extend further a jurisprudential debate 3 that has produced somewhat
67. E.g., L. FULLER, THE MoRALrry oF LAw (1964).
68. Prominent theorists include Lloyd Weinreb, John Finnis and Michael Moore. See L.
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987); J. Fons, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980); see, e.g., Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277
(1985); Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 1061.
69. R. SumMERS, supra note 45, at 20. Putting the matter differently, "[p]ositivism has
often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to deny, that there can be unjust laws."
Lyons, The Connection Between Law and Morality: Comments on Dworkin, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 485 (1986).
70. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V"D. L. RIv. 395 (1950); cf. Bishin, The Law
Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 1 (1965) ("The only
certainty is that the 'limits of adjudication' are uncertain and that the range of legitimate
judicial choice is great.").
71. Popkin, supra note 27, at 627.
72. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 53; see also L. FuLLER, supra note 67 (Fuller's attack on Hart's
positivism); Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977) (Hart's criticism of natural law theory).
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disappointing results. 74 Or perhaps it is part of a larger trend toward
pluralism in American legal theory.75
Moreover, in application, the plain meaning and .political models do not
seem to be entirely incompatible approaches. For example, whether a
particular meaning is plain from the language of the statute will, like other
questions of interpretation, be determined by the response that attracts the
dominant group-what Stanley Fish has called an "interpretive commu-
nity."' 76 In the Supreme Court, five or more Justices joining in the same
portion of a judicial opinion can be said to constitute that "community"
necessary to give an interpretation full legal authority. 77 Yet Justices may
be in this interpretive community for different reasons. It may be impossible
to separate positivist and natural law impulses within the community" or
even within the thinking of a single Justice. To illustrate the latter, one
Justice might be aided in concluding that a particular plain meaning exists
by the conviction that it is a meaning that the words of the statute plainly
should have in a good world.
The final and perhaps most significant factor easing tension between the
plain meaning and political models is the added presence of intentionalism.
Recall that intentionalism strives to derive the legislature's intended meaning.
74. Cf. P. AmrrAt & R. SuMMEas, supra note 51, at 262 (noting that "American legal
theory generally" has been unable to devise "a synthesis reconciling natural law and positiv-
ism").
75. Pluralism characterized American attitudes towards law through the first half of the
nineteenth century, declining thereafter with the rise of legal formalism. See L. FRIEDAN, A
HisTORY OF AMiucAN LAW 331-35 (1973); G. GILMORE, supra note 65, at 45-46. For reflection
of this shift on a particular set of legal questions, see T. FREYER, HARMONY & DISsoNAAcE:
Tm SwIFT & ERIE CASs n AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981), and Shreve, From Swift to Erie:
An Historical Perspective, 82 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1984). Pluralism re-emerged with the decline
of formalism early in this century and is now a frequent if quixotic feature in legal theory.
For further discussion of pluralism, see infra notes 206-08.
76. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN TnS CLASS? 14 (1980); see also Easterbrook, Legal
Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HAgv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 87, 87 (1987)
("Words have meaning only to the extent there is some agreement among a community of
users of language."). For application of the interpretive-community concept to legal theory,
see Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv.
551, 552 (1982). Some have attacked this view because it seems to invite the assumption that
conflict between interpretive communities for the dominant (hence real) meaning of a text goes
on without reference to notions of value or higher social good. Might makes right; or, at
least, might makes meaning. See, e.g., Cornell, Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions
of Community in the Law, 54 TENN. L. REv. 327, 328-29 (1987) (criticizing "Fish's conven-
tionalism").
77. Cases in which a majority cannot join in one opinion produce only plurality opinions.
These have considerably less authority than majority opinions. How much is a matter of
question. See Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,
1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HAuv. L. REv.
1127 (1981).
78. Apparently Professor Fish would not find this cause for concern. "[I]t is interpretive
communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that produce meanings and are
responsible for the emergence of formal features." S. FISH, supra note 76, at 14.
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This makes intentionalism both like and unlike each of the other two
approaches. Like political interpretation, intentionalism does not confine a
search for meaning to textual language alone. Like the plain meaning rule,
intentionalism is antagonistic to a natural law approach because it claims
to be indifferent to the rightness of the result. Thus, intentionalist justifi-
cations may overlap with either the plain meaning79 or political0 models of
statutory interpretation.
While it is difficult to verify, intentionalism seems to hold its own when
standing alone"' and when at cross purposes with either the plain meaning8 2
or political models. 3 Why intentionalism does this well against perspectives
with superior jurisprudential credentials" is probably in large part 5 because
it so forcefully expresses the separation-of-powers advantage in lawmaking
that legislators usually enjoy over courts. 6 The advantage manifests itself
most obviously in the rule that the common law a court makes can neither
79. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. On the bedrock importance of intentionalism
in statutory interpretation, see, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 67-86. Cf. Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In final analysis,
any question of statutory construction requires the judge to decide how the legislature intended
its enactment to apply to the case at hand.").
82. See Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 60-61 (noting how conclusions about what the
legislature intended can replace the "written word" of the statute as "the real law").
83. See, e.g., Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 87 GEo. L.J. 281 (1989) (arguing
that the notion of legislative supremacy can obstruct the normatively best or "dynamic"
statutory interpretation).
84. See supra notes 42-68 and accompanying text. Intentionalism's relatively weak juris-
prudential base makes it an attractive, target. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 28, at 642-50
(Professor Eskridge's survey of what he terms realist, historicist and formalist criticisms).
85. In a recent article, Professor Anthony D'Amato offers a different basis for intention-
alism. D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L.
REV. 561 (1989). While "no interpreter has direct knowledge of the mind of the author," id.
at 561, legislatures can use jurisprudential theory to shorten the distance between meanings
they might intend for statutes and the meanings judges give them: "[I]f an audience believes
a given jurisprudential theory, that audience has forfeited a few of its degrees of interpretive
freedom, and ... if the legislature knows this fact about its audience, it may be able to use
jurisprudence to its advantage." Id. at 595.
86. On the separation-of-powers doctrine, see generally W. Gwxsq, Tn MENimo OF THE
SEPARATION OF PowERS (1965). Widely accepted, the idea that the judiciary's substantive
preferences are subordinate to those of the legislature is firmly established in the federal
government and in the governments of most states. See, e.g., P. ATrAH & R. Summizs, supra
note 51, at 8-9; R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 7; J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 3
(1980); M. VnE, CONsrrnoNAUsM AND THE SEPARATON OF POwERs (1967); Casper, An
Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & MARY L. Ray.
211, 214 (1989); Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal
Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474 (1989); Jackson, supra note 40, at 536; Sharp, The
Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CH. L. Ray. 385 (1935);
Nicol, The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers, 30 Wm. &
MARY L. REa. 209 (1989).
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defy nor outlive the will of the legislature. 7 Without intentionalism, courts
could easily undermine that rule by revising legislative judgments through
statutory interpretation.8 At the same time, most agree that historical
evidence of legislative intent can be so scant or contradictory as to tax even
a dispassionate historian.89 Law's adversary process magnifies such uncer-
tainty, exposing the inquiry to manipulation and distortion as each side
struggles to establish a usable past. 90 To insist on a determination of
legislative intent from inconclusive legislative history risks having the judge
act as a legislator, 91 turning the separation-of-powers rationale for inten-
tionalism upside down. 92 None of this is to suggest that intentionalist inquiry
is invariably futile, only that (as in Will) it can be.
87. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (recognizing the
"paramount authority of Congress" to nullify federal common law announced only a year
earlier).
88. According to one scholar:
In the division of responsibilities represented by the constitutional separation of
powers, the legislature calls the main policy turns and the courts must respect its
pronouncements. In such a relationship, it would seem clear that so far as the
legislature has expressed itself by statute the courts should try to determine as
accurately as possible what the legislature intended to be done.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 67. For recent commentary in this vein, see Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281 (1989); Maltz, Statutory Interpre-
tation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 Ttm. L.
REv. 1 (1988); Marshall, "Let Congress Do It': The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
The plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation also defers to legislatures, but in a
different, less forceful way. Legislatures' sovereign authority underpins veneration of statutory
text under a plain meaning approach. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. Deference
fades, however, when the approach calls for freestanding text to trump actual legislative intent.
See supra note 32. The clearest nexus between plain meaning and separation-of-powers is likely
to be in cases where actual intent is unfathomable and emphasis on text chosen by the
legislature is a bulwark against freewheeling political interpretation. See infra note 92.
89. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 40. Matters are "aggravated by the extraordinary
difficulties of aggregating the 'intentions' of a multimember body." Sunstein, supra note 19,
at 433; see also Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Jurisprudential Temperament of
Federal Judges, 20 IND. L. REv. 453, 506 (1987); Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process
Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 Auz. L. Rav. 413, 453 (1987).
90. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 534 ("Inferences almost always conflict, and the
enacting Congress is unlikely to come back to life and 'prove' the court's construction wrong.").
91. Cf. United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by analysis
of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress .... Never having been
a Congressman, I am handicapped in that weird endeavor. That process seems
to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.
Id.
92. In this setting, history-based intentionalism shades into a political approach, see supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text, and a greater degree of separation-of-powers deference
may be possible by shifting to a plain meaning approach. See Farber, supra note 88, at 286-
87; Jackson, supra note 40, at 537-38. On the other hand, plain meaning too can mask political
preferences. See Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297
(1990).
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D. Emergence of Political Models of Interpretation in Will
1. Insufficient Opportunities for Plain Meaning
and Intentionalist Approaches
The majority and the dissent expressed their differences in Will on the
same level. Plain meaning arguments were not a factor. Both sides pressed
intentionalist arguments, but without great effect. Ultimately, the majority
and the dissent clashed over political interpretations of section 1983. It will
be useful to examine these matters more closely and to consider whether
an exhaustion of approaches to interpretation under this triadic scheme gave
the Court in Will enough with which to work.
Understandably, neither side really pushed the plain meaning approach
in Will. It is difficult to argue that section 1983's "person" plainly includes
state governments. Whether it plainly excludes them might have been more
of a question. However, after the Court's earlier difficulty in defining the
same term regarding municipalities,93 it would have been hard to argue that
any definition of "person" was plain enough to provide a freestanding
basis for interpreting the statute.Y The majority contented itself with the
suggestion that the use of the term "person" "would be a decidedly
awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability. '95
Did Congress intend "person" in section 1983 to include states? The Will
dissent and majority exchanged familiar arguments. In Quern v. Jordan,96
the Supreme Court had rejected the use of section 1983 for retroactive relief
against a state officer in his official capacity. At minimum, the Court in
Quern based its position on the effect of the eleventh amendment on that
federal case. It is less clear whether Quern entirely anticipated the Court's
ruling in Will that a state was not a "person" under section 1983. It came
93. The Supreme Court ruled in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled, Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipality was not a "person."
From that premise in Monroe, the Court later reasoned that § 1983 "could not have been
-intended to include States as parties defendant." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452
(1976). But the Supreme Court thereafter overruled that part of Monroe excluding municipalities
from § 1983 coverage. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663. Much has been written on these and related
developments. See infra note 260. Reopened by Monell but eclipsed in federal cases by the
eleventh amendment, the question whether states were "persons" within § 1983 festered in
state courts until Will. For state decisions going both ways, see Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2306-07 & n.3 (1989).
94. Cf. 13B C. WwrxaT, A. MH.LER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AN PROCEDURE §
3573.1, at 198 (1984) ("The defendant in a § 1983 action must be a 'person,' but this had
been, and may still be, construed as a term of art.").
95. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2308.
96. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). For discussions of this case, see Note, Amenability of States to
Section 1983 Suits: Reexamining Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REv. 731 (1982); and Note,
Quern v. Jordan: A Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits Against States, 67 CALiF. L. REv.
407 (1979).
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close to doing so by stating "we are unwilling to believe, on the basis of
such slender 'evidence,' that Congress intended by the general language of
section 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." 97
Both sides in Will clothed their arguments in intentionalist language, yet
as in Quern, neither side could muster convincing evidence about what
Congress intended for section 1983 in damage actions. It seems doubtful
whether adequate evidence exists. 9 In the end, both sides tried to make
tactical use of the absence of a clear congressional intent in a battle of
presumptions. The majority presumed a state was not a "person" because
of the lack of a convincing indication that Congress intended section 1983
to reach states. 99 The dissent presumed states were covered in the absence
of a convincing demonstration that Congress intended to exclude them.1' °
Once their arguments reached this point, the majority and dissent aban-
doned any real intentionalist concern. Both sides used the same pair of
factual hypotheses-either that evidence which would prove what Congress
intended was lost, or that Congress did not really care about the question
whether section 1983 applied to states-to support their opposing conclu-
sions. The strongest claim of affiliation that one arguing at this level can
make with the particular legislative body enacting the statute is merely that
a proposed interpretation is within the spirit or ulterior purpose of the
statute.1°1
2. Free Play in Will of Political Interpretations
of Section 19.83
Evidence of actual congressional intent behind section 1983 mattered to
the Justices in Will only if it clearly blocked the readings they wished to
give the statute. 0 2 So freewheeling an approach invited (perhaps required)
97. Quern, 440 U.S. at 342. Dissenting in Quern, Justice Brennan felt that the majority
had concluded that states were not parties under § 1983. Id. at 350.
98. Professor Sunstein noted that, "although courts and commentators have devoted much
attention to the legislative history of section 1983, there remains considerable dispute about
the intended scope of that provision." Sunstein, supra note 2, at 396-97. This is true concerning
the question what, if anything, Congress intended concerning states as "persons" under the
statute. Evidence from congressional debates preceding the enactment of § 1983 reveals little
or no interest in the subject of state liability. See Quern, 440 U.S. at 343; see also S.
SaTrNoLAss, supra note 3, at § 9.2(b)(2). Nor do either of the opposing arguments based on
the contemporaneous Dictionary Act, Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2310-11, id. at 2315-16 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), offer much assistance in determining whether Congress intended § 1983 to
reach states.
99. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2308-11.
100. Id. at 2317-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text; cf. Beermann, supra note 2, at 57
(viewing as "discredited the idea that one can answer important questions just by reading the
text and legislative history of § 1983").
102. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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them to import their own values into the inquiry. The majority and the
dissent responded by using versions of political interpretation for section
1983. To understand the politics of Will, let us consider the statute more
closely. Although the particular consequences following treatment of states
as "persons" will remain a matter of speculation,1 0 3 the bare suggestion
that they are within section 1983 strikes a deep political chord. The statute
exists to make real the constraints of federal substantive law. It protects
civil rights forged during the Reconstruction era.1°4 But section 1983 also
protects rights under the Constitution generally, 105 as well as those under
federal statutes.?° The decision whether to read a significant category of
cases out of section 1983 therefore touches a "relationship between the
themes of federalism and individual rights" that "runs deep in American
intellectual and social history."' °7
Will is enmeshed in a larger political struggle between individual rights
and federalism that has two important components. The first is the idea
that federal substantive law will at any given time'01 privilege some types
of individuals or groups over others. 109 That is, it secures particular political
advantages. Currently, in civil litigation, federal, substantive law
103. For a discussion of this point, see infra notes 222-71 and accompanying text.
104. Comment, supra note 2, at 1153-56. "[T]he draftsman [sic] of the measure were
primarily concerned with suppressing the Klan ..... " Id. at 1154. In addition:
[M]ost Congressmen viewed the situation in the South as exacerbated by the
inaction of the state and local governments. A full reading of the debates compels
the conclusion that the Act [today § 1983] was aimed at least as much at the
abdication of law enforcement responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at
the Klan's outrages.
Id. For a reflection of this view, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1972).
105. There is some question whether the section reaches claims based directly on the
supremacy and commerce clauses. 13B C. WasGam, A. MHXaR & E. COOPER, supra note 94,
§ 3573.2 (Supp. 1990); Note, Clarifying Comity, supra'note 3, at 1895 n.57; Note, Section
1983 Remedies for the Violation of Supremacy Clause Rights, 97 YALE L.J. 1827 (1988).
106. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1990); Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). See generally Note, Statutory Non-Civil Rights Violations of Section
1983 and Awards of Attorney's Fees After Maine v. Thiboutot, 61 B.U.L. REv. 1069 (1981);
Comment, Remedies for Statutory Violations Under Sections 1983 and 1985(c), 37 WA.sH. &
LEE L. R~ay. 309 (1980). For a variety of federal statutes that have been recognized under §
1983, see Nahmod, supra note 2, § 2.12.
107. Comment, supra note 2, at 1135.
108. Over time, different groups are likely to enjoy political advantages under federal law:
For example, federal law was politically conservative in the late nineteenth century,
favoring monied, corporate interests to a greater extent than state law. This was
true of both the general federal common law created under Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842), see [J.W. HURsT, supra note 26, at 190], and federal constitutional
law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 113 (1908), offers' an illustration of the latter.
Concluding that the eleventh amendment did not bar suit, the Court held that
Minnesota's statute attempting to set maximum railroad rates violated the due
process clause.
Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment,, 64 IN. L.J. 601, 605-06 n.22 (1989).
109. This is not to suggest that institutions responsible for the content of federal law will
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seems generally to favor interests supported by the liberal left. In
particular, federal civil rights law, usually vindicated through... section
1983, has offered special advantages to minorities, to the disadvantaged,
and to individuals who feel intruded upon by government. Typical section
.1983 litigation finds persons so aggrieved suing state or local 'officials.
The left is likely to be solicitous of the interests of such plaintiffs.
On the other side, conservatives are likely to sympathize with govern-
ment defendants either because they see the benefit to which the plaintiff
claims a right as one which the government should have the discretion
to withhold, or because they see the plaintiff's suit as interference with
government's realization of some moral agenda. Moreover, conservatives
favor local autonomy in making and enforcing moral judgments and
find interruptions from without . . . particularly irritating."10
Generally speaking, most would probably agree that the Warren Court
reflected liberal sentiments,"' that the Burger Court became increasingly
conservative'1 2 and that the Rehnquist Court registers strongly on the
at any time be in complete accord. A vivid example of discord may be found in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), where the Supreme Court's decision
invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Professor Hurst wrote of the Court's
reaction to the NIRA: "A majority of the Justices were emotionally as well as intellectually
opposed to the administration's broad intervention in the economy." J.W. HURST, supra note
26, at 407. For further discussion of the political climate in which Schechter was decided, see
R. MAYER, THE COURT AND THE AmIUCAN CUSES: 1930-1952 (1987); and W. SWINDLER,
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN TE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A MODERN INTERPRETATION 3944
(1974).
110. Shreve, supra note 108, at 605-06. For a characterization similar to the one above, see
A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 348 (1987). But cf. West, Progressive and
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. Rv. 641, 641-45 (1990) (suggesting that the full
development of liberal and conservative salients came at different times). "[Lliberal and critical
legal discourses that dominated constitutional law in the sixties and seventies have been replaced
by conservative and progressive discourses, respectively." Id. at 643.
I examined concerns attending a liberal-conservative paradigm and made the paradigm a bit
more precise when the synopsis in the text accompanying this note first appeared. Shreve,
supra note 108, at 604-07. Two points developed there might be useful to mention in passing.
First, by left, I mean the liberal or near left. No attempt is made to include in the paradigm
the views of those farther left, the Critical Legal Studies Movement for example, and there is
some question whether that would be a realistic or useful exercise. Id. at 606 n.23. Second,
there is at least a question whether libertarian impulses periodically attributed to conservatives
contradict description of the conservative side of the paradigm. However, Court conservatives
have been at best erratic in giving application to libertarian principles. Id. at 606 n.27.
111. See, e.g., D. O'BRIEN, SToRM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLrrTcs
158-60 (1986); ELY, supra note 86; at 73-75; cf. West, supra note 110, at 641-42 ("liberal
legalism" dominated the Supreme Court during this time). For an attempt to plot liberal
decision making according to categories of cases, see R. CARP & C. ROWLAND, POUCYItAKx1G
AND POLITICS IN TIE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 20-21, 38 (1983).
112. See, e.g., A. GALuE, Tan BURGER COURT: 1968-1984 ix-xv (1986); Gelfand, The Burger
Court and the New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government
Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C.L. REv. 763 (1980); cf. Brown, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment
on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy"
Cases, 27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 909 (1986) ("A hallmark of the Burger Court's overall judicial
federalism has been resistance to use of the federal courts to restructure sub-national institu-
tions.").
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conservative side of the paradigm.1 13 Yet, while increased conservatism in
the Supreme Court and in the lower federal courts114 has restricted possible
applications of federal constitutional or statutory law, it has not yet brought
about a fundamental political transformation of the law itself.' Federal
law typically does not restrain states from pursuing different or more
ambitious liberal objectives through their laws. It usually manifests itself,
if at all, by supplementing state law recognition of liberal values." 6
The second component of the tension between individual rights and
federalism concerns state governments' comprehension of federal substantive
law and their willingness to enforce it. Initially, it may be useful to compare
this factor in Will with the way it manifests itself in a different, more
accustomed setting: when the question is whether lower federal courts are
prevented from entertaining suits against state and local officials." 7 An
important parallel exists between the clash of political sensibilities over the
113. See, e.g., Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 189, 193.(1988) (identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy as a "conservative phalanx"); West, supra note 110, at 641 ("Over the last few
years, a substantial and growing number of Supreme Court Justices ... have begun to
articulate a profoundly conservative interpretation of the constitutional tradition."). Corre-
spondingly, former Justice Brennan and Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens represent
the vestiges of liberal sentiment. Cf. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial
Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1987) (describing the
group as "the liberal four").
114. Professors Collins and Skover wrote in 1988 that more than 48% of.sitting federal
judges are Reagan appointees. Collins & Skover, supra note 113. Professors Carp and Rowland
argue from their data a distinct correlation between the political philosophies of the appointing
Presidents and their judicial appointees. R. CARP & C. RoWLAND, supra note 111, at 51-81.
115. Federal substantive law lacks the pronounced conservative character that it had, for
example, in the late 19th century. See supra note 108.
116. Consider the following illustration. When a civil rights litigant demonstrates denial of
a federal right, a state court cannot refuse relief on the ground that the challenged conduct
comports with state law. Yet the state court may provide relief when that litigant successfully
asserts a right under the state constitution, even if the conduct complained of does not violate
the United States Constitution. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In the first
situation, federal law disrupts the regime of more conservative state law. In the second, state
law is unimpeded by more conservative federal law. Such is the significance of a determination
of rights under state law that "the state court's ruling with respect to the federal question,
even though arguably wrong, becomes superfluous and thus incapable of triggering Supreme
Court jurisdiction." R. STERN, E. GRSSmArN & S. SHAPIRo, SUPREmE COURT PRACTICE 168
(6th ed. 1986).
117. For example, the Supreme Court began with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
a series of cases denying federal court access to civil rights plaintiffs already parties in state
proceedings. The last major case in the group was Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. I
(1987). See Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations
on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1051 (1988); Stravitz, Younger
Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 57 FoRuaLAm L. REv. 997
(1989). For recent descriptions of the Younger doctrine, see E. CHEmEINsKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION §§ 13.1-13.4 (1989); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIoNs IN THE ALLO-
CATION OF JUDIcIAL POWER 291-321 (1990); and Lee & Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental
Jurisdiction and Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 321, 348-56.
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authority of lower federal courts to entertain federal rights claims against
states, 8 and controversies (like Will) over possible state immunity to pro-
ceedings enforcing federal rights in all courts.
The first half of the parallel rests on the assumption that state courts
give less life overall to federal law than do federal courts. Some have urged
the contrary, that state courts provide as receptive an environment for
federal law. 1 9 Difficult as these arguments have been to disprove, 20 they
seem wrong. State judges are in many cases under no obligation to read
federal rights as broadly as federal judges might 2' and probably do not do
so overall.'22 However lacking in empirical support, the suspicion that federal
law fares less well in state courts is widespread 23 and is a leading justification
for the federal question jurisdiction of lower federal courts.'2 At the same
time, deference to state courts should not depend on a demonstration that
118. "History ... underscores that any model identifying the 'proper' role of the federal
courts has inescapable and far-reaching substantive implications, and, as a result, an unavoid-
able political dimension." Chemerinsky & Kramer, Defining the Role of Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 76. For example, "because it determines the ability of federal courts to
hear suits against state governments, the eleventh amendment is crucial to defining the content
of American federalism." Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh
Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DE PAUL L. REv.
321, 322 (1990).
119. E.g., Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 213 (1983).
120. Difficulties in demonstrating federal court superiority in this regard are examined at
length in Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988). He writes: "The problem is that without empirical measurement,
each side of the parity debate simply has an intuitive judgment about whether the institutional
differences between federal and state courts matter in constitutional cases." Id. at 278-79.
121. As I noted in an earlier article:
If state judges read federal law less broadly than federal judges, they are not a
priori in violation of the supremacy clause. [U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.] The duty
imposed by the supremacy clause to enforce federal law is not the duty to give
it the broadest possible reading, only a duty to give it a reasonable reading and
one in keeping with controlling precedent. The only federal decisions on the
meaning of federal law which bind state courts are those of the United States
Supreme Court.
Shreve, supra note 108, at 605 n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
122. See Shreve, supra note 108, at 605 (citations omitted):
[O]ne need not question the good faith or diligence of state judges to conclude
that they are unlikely overall to read as much into federal substantive law. Since
they work with their state law more than federal judges do, it would be natural
for them to give it more life and federal law correspondingly less.
123. E.g., Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1151-64
(1988); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HAv. L. Rav. 1105 (1977); Redish, Judicial Parity,
Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitu-
tional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988); Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REv.
283, 336 (1988).
124. E.g., A.L.I., STUDY OF TH DrvisION OF JURISDICTON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 167-68 (1969); cf. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. Rev.
317, 328 (1978) ("All grants of federal jurisdiction are based upon some perceived inadequacy
of state courts.").
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federal rights will be worth just as much there. Because it promotes
harmonious relations between the federal government and state and local
governments, the supposition that state courts win respect federal law is a
gesture having value in itself. 1'1 Most agree the gesture is worth making
even at some cost. 126 Therefore, the issue becomes: assuming federal rights
diminish in cases tried in state rather than federal court, 27 when is that an
acceptable cost for advancing policies of federalism?
In Will, the parallel question is this: assuming that reading states out of
section 1983 appreciably diminishes enforcement of federal rights, 12  is this
an acceptable cost for advancing policies of federalism? 2 9 The conservative
and liberal wings of the Supreme Court split on this question in Will just
as they have often split on the question whether lower federal courts should
give way to state courts.
130
3. The Problem
Rich as Will is in material for political interpretations of the statute,
decision on this basis alone is disquieting. It may help in understanding this
to compare Will with the following hypothetical situation.
125. See, e.g., H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLrrcs, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 52-54 (1961);
Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L.
Rnv. 151, 161-65 (1987).
126. As one might expect, this sentiment is voiced more frequently by the conservative wing
of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 481 U.S. 1. But liberals agree in theory and
periodically in application. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 840-41 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing greater discretion for state courts in choice of law); Allied
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530-33 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stressing
the importance of federalism in interpreting the Constitution).
127. Usually, remission to state court does more than delay access to a federal trial court.
It eliminates it altogether. Through the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1988), claim or issue preclusion from the state case usually makes federal court relitigation
impossible. E.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). On recognition of state judgments in federal court, see
generally Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 Tax. L. REV. 1209 (1986).
128. Whether, in practical terms, the dissent's interpretation of § 1983 actually would have
resulted in significantly greater state court access is another matter. See infra notes 269-71 and
accompanying text.
129. See E. CnamuwNsK"y, Federal Jurisdiction 71 (Supp. 1990) (describing the confrontation
in Will as federalism versus protection against constitutional violations); cf. Note, State
Remedies for Federally-Created Rights, 47 MwN. L. Rav. 815, 817 (1963) ("[Tlhe federal
interest of securing the effective enforcement of federal rights may conflict with the state
interest in remaining an independent, viable political unit able to direct the objectives of its
judicial system.").
130. On the latter, see supra notes 116-17. Concerning the former, Professor Beermann
observed that "[t]he liberal favors expanding the definition of 'persons' subject to suit under
§ 1983 to include state and local governments and their officials, for all of the reasons that
she desires more effective § 1983 enforcement." Beermann, supra note 2, at 99. In noting
Will, Beermann states that "[t]he conservative would not include states and state agencies as
persons, so that federal courts, or state courts applying federal law, would not meddle in state
affairs." Id. (footnote omitted).
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Assume that Congress amended section 1983, giving readers of the statute
direction they now lack in answering the question whether states are in-
cluded. Whether the amendment placed states in or out of section 1983,
and even if it passed Congress by a single vote, the Supreme Court would
give that effect to the statute-probably by unanimous decision. Congress'
ad hoc political judgment in revising section 1983 and the stature of the
Court's decision enforcing it as amended would both be secure. The former
is secure because of the position Congress enjoys as an elected, representative
body; the latter because the Court (though an unrepresentative body) has a
"reasoned justification"'' for judicial decision-the separation-of-powers
obligation 3 2 to enforce the political will of Congress. That is, the Court
could give a reason for deciding the case applicable to a category of similar
cases:' that Congress directed the result in a way valid under the Consti-
tution. 134
131. The term is from Greenawalt. Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral
Principles, 78 COLUm. L. REv. 982, 999 (1978). Explaining the added pressure on courts for
what he termed reasoned justification, Professor Greenawalt noted: "Legislatures are repre-
sentative and politically responsible and the legitimacy of statutes derives largely from these
characteristics. Courts are not representative and responsible in the same senses." Id. Courts
must appeal to the public to approve their decisions because they are more vulnerable
institutionally than legislatures, one reason judicial opinions have no real counterpart in the
legislative process. Cf. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism
and Social Change, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 279, 285 (1973) (noting how judges are "required to make
public the justifications for their decisions, thus inviting comment on their performance").
132. See generally supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
133. While controversy exists over applications and ultimate reach of the proposition, there
is wide acceptance for the view that a good judicial decision must offer a reason why the
same result would occur in a category of like cases. See, e.g., Golding, Principled Decision-
Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLum. L. Rav. 35 (1963); Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 501, 501-02 (1948); Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal
Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. Ray. 833 (1982); Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justi-
fication: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45 (1985); Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CALI. L.. Rnv. 1 (1974). Professor Golding expressed the idea this way
in his model of "Principled Decision-Making":
A decision or judgment is principled only when it is, guided by some "external
consideration," i.e., a guiding principle that contributes to the deliberation on
the case. Such a principle is a reason (or part of the reasons) for the decision.
It cannot be a reason for the decision unless it determines, at least to some
extent, the outcome of the process of deliberation. This means that a principle
cannot be so flexible as to allow for free-wheeling discretion. Furthermore, in
applying a principle, the instant case must be treated ... in a certain manner
because it is held to be proper to treat cases of its type in that manner. In this
way every principled judgment makes, or rests upon, a universal, or general,
claim.
Golding, supra, at 40 (emphasis in original).
134. So long as Congress acts within the spacious authority conferred by separation of
powers, there is much in the view that "the Constitution adopts a scheme of pure procedural
justice: whatever results from the operation of the political process is constitutionally acceptable,
and there are no external evaluative criteria against which that outcome can be measured."
Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REv. 49, 80 (1989).
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Neither of the contending factions found material in Will for a decision
of such stature. Obscurities of legislative history and textual language made
it impossible to claim convincingly either reading as an act of fidelity to
Congress. The Court was left to fashion its own solution to the interpretive
problem of whether section 1983 created damages liability for states. It is
difficult to find reasoned justification for a response under these circum-
stances, difficult to support either choice with a rule applicable to a larger
category of judicial decisions. 35 The Justices in Will seem hardly more
distanced from ad hoc politics than Congress would have been in amending
the statute to more clearly provide an answer.
This is not to suggest that Will lacks legal authority. After all, the
Supreme Court was forced to take the indeterminate legislative history and
language of section 1983 as it found it. And the Court did not have the
option of refusing to decide the case because the meaning of the statute
was unclear. 3 6 1 merely suggest that exhaustion of opportunities for statutory
interpretation under intentionalism, plain meaning and political interpreta-
tion-the trio of approaches I have considered so far-leaves the Court's
decision in Will on less than firm ground. As Professor Kent Greenawalt
has observed, "[flor any well functioning governance, it is as important
that decisions seem appropriate as well as that they are appropriate. This
is especially true for the courts, which are supposed to dispense even-handed
justice.''' 37
135. The following may help to illustrate the idea that judicial reasoning cannot make one
political (moral) choice more attractive than another:
Some moral philosophers think utilitarianism is the answer; others feel just as
strongly it is not. Some regard enforced economic redistribution as a moral
imperative; others find it morally censurable. What may be the two most renowned
recent works of moral and political philosophy, John Rawls' A Theory of Justice
[(1971)] and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia [(1974)], reach very
different conclusions. There simply does not exist a method of moral philosophy.
One might be tempted to suppose that there will be no systematic bias in the
judges' rendition of "correct moral reasoning" aside from whatever derives from
the philosophical axioms from which they begin. ("We like Rawls, you like
Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated.").
J. ELY, supra note 86, at 58 (emphasis in original).
136. Cf. Greenawalt, siipra note 131, at 1007 (noting "the widespread presupposition that
the law that judges interpret is comprehensible").
137. Greenawalt, supra note 131, at 999; see also Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal
Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. Rv. 1, 3, 38-42 (1974). The concern
is greatest in cases like Will where those participating in the decision are "closely divided"
and "an issue is politically controversial." Greenawalt, supra note 131, at 1007. But see
Beermann, supra note 2, at 101:
The way to understand the controversy over § 1983 is to understand its political
and ideological aspects and to open the process to real assessment of the facts
rather than stylized policy arguments. What is needed are data regarding the
social costs of more or less enforcement, and straight talk about a political vision
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
One is left with the impression that an additional approach to interpreting
section 1983 would have been useful. The balance of this Article explores
how legal pragmatism might fill that role in Will and other cases.
III. THE UNDISCLOSED PRAGMATISM OF THE RESULT N WL
A few observations by Robert Summers help to introduce the sections
that follow. Professor Summers identified the three jurisprudential move-
ments which I have noted-historical jurisprudence,- analytical positivism
and natural law"'-and added one more. "In my opinion," he wrote, "its
substance and range qualify pragmatic instrumentalism as a fourth great
tradition in Western legal theory. . . ."19 Having seen in intentionalism,
plain meaning and political interpretation reflections of the first three
jurisprudential movements identified by Professor Summers, I now consider
how an approach to statutory interpretation rooted in pragmatist legal
theory' 4° might contribute to a more secure decision in Will.
In popular usage, pragmatism connotes purposeful conduct,1 4' a preference
for weighing the effects of possible actions and choosing the most practical
course.'
4 2 Pragmatism's commonly accepted role in legal discourse is much
for § 1983 ....
For further argument in this vein, see Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971 (1990).
"[T]he Court is a political institution that minorities must treat politically if they are to use
the Court to facilitate rather than retard the advancement of minority interests." Id. at 2032.
138. R. SUMMERs, supra note 45, at 19. Professor Berman's recent article addresses the
three movements, their similarities and their differences. See Berman, supra note 24.
139. R. SummEas, supra note 45, at 19. Professor Summers prefers the term "pragmatic
instrumentalism" to pragmatism. Id. at 20. But see Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal
Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 988, 1011-13 (1984)
(questioning Summers' view of pragmatism as legal theory capable of comparison with the
other three).
140. Neglected during the middle third of this century, pragmatism has gathered interest in
the legal academy, especially in recent years. Most writing has been at the level of general
theory. E.g., G. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1977);
R. PosNmR, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); R. SUMMERS, supra note 45; Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Hantzis, Legal Innovation
Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82
Nw. U.L. REV. 541 (1988); Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-A Pathological
Study, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 949 (1981); Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice and
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REv. 937 (1990); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARv. L. REv.
332 (1986); Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-
A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 861 (1981).
A smaller amount of writing has treated substantive matters, principally the rights of
individuals and groups. E.g., Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MIN. L.
REv. 1331 (1988); Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990).
Pragmatist forays into the subject of statutory interpretation have just begun. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 43. The authors argue their public-choice theory of statutory interpretation
by blending hermeneutics with a version of pragmatism different from that offered in this
Article. For further discussion of their article, see infra notes 278-87 and accompanying text.
141. E.g., Neuman, Pragmatists Likely to Stick to Business, USA Today, May 29, 1990, at
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the same: a kind of ad hoc exhortation that we keep an eye on the reliability
of our methods and the success of our results. In statutory interpretation,
as elsewhere in the law, pragmatism would be important for this alone.' 43
However, this Article expects of pragmatism a greater, more freestanding
role as legal theory. Such a project must confront the fact that pragmatism's
jurisprudential underpinnings are less clearly understood than those of
historical jurisprudence, natural law or analytical positivism. The following
discussion is offered to fill that gap, to consider something of pragmatism's
history, meaning and frailties.
A. The Pragmatist Movement
Pragmatism began before the turn of the century as a distinctly American
philosophical movement, and "[iut is primarily as a movement rather than
by any one doctrine that pragmatism is best understood." 1 4 The leading
contributors were Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey. 45
IA (describing preparations for a meeting between President Bush and Soviet President
Gorbachev).
142. See 2 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2266 (Compact ed; 1971) (defining pragmatism
as "[a] method of treating history in which the phenomena are considered with special reference
to their causes, antecedent conditions, and results, and to their practical lessons").
143. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 498 ("Inevitably, statutory construction is an exercise
of practical reason, in which text, history, and purpose interact with background understandings
in the legal culture.").
144. Thayer, Introduction to PRAGMATISM: THE CLASSIC WsRnGs at 11 (H.S. Thayer ed.
1970). For descriptions of the movement, see A.J. AYER, TH ORIGINs OF PRAGMATISM (1968);
2 E. FLOWER & M. MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF PHnOSOPHY IN AMERICA 567-692, 811-958 (1977);
B. KUKmCK, TH RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 104-26, 159-79 (1977); PRAGMATISM: ITS
SOURCES AND PROSPECTS (R. Mulvaney & P. Zeltner ed. 1981); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM (1982); R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989); R. RoRTY,
PI.osoPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); H.S. THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM (1968); C. WEST, Tan AMEUCAN EvAsION OF PRILOsoPHY:
A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989); M. WHr, TH ORIGIN OF DEwEy'S INSTRUMENTAISM
(1943) [M. WHITE, DEWEY'S IN STRUMENTALSM]; M. WHITE, PRAGMATISM AND THE AMERICAN
MID (1973); P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM (1949); Ezorsky,
Pragmatic Theory of Truth, in 6 TH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHmosoPHY 427-30 (P. Edward ed.
1967); and Thayer, Pragmatism; in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 430-36
[hereinafter Thayer, Pragmatism].
145. Introductory studies of Peirce, James and Dewey appear in P. CoNKIn, PuarrANs AND
PRAGMATISTS 193-402 (1968). For selected bibliographies of the works of the three philosophers
and the exegetical literature surrounding them, see, for example, W. GALLm, PEIRCE AND
PRAGMATISM 243-44 (1966) (regarding Peirce); G. MYERS, WILIAM JAm.s: HIS Ln AND
THOUGHT xix-xxi, 293 (1986) (regarding James); M. WHrrT, DEWEY's INSTRUMENTALISM, supra
note 144, at 153-54 (regarding Dewey); and PRAGMATISM: TH CLASSIC WRITINGS, supra note
144, at 379-82 (regarding Peirce, James and Dewey).
A longer list of pragmatist philosophers would include Americans C.I. Lewis, see H.S.
THAYER, supra note 144, at 205-31; C.I. Lewis Commemorative Symposium, 61 J. PHiL. 545
(1964), and George Mead, see M. NATANSON, Tan SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GEORGE H. MAD
(1956); H.S. THAYER, supra note 144, at 232-68, and the English philosopher F.C.S. Schiller,
see R. ABEL, TH PRAGMATIC HUMANISM OF F.C.S. SCHILLER (1955); H.S. THAYER, supra, at
273-303.
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Although the movement has been grouped under various terms'" which can
inform legal theory, this Article will follow recent practice and refer to
works within the movement generically as pragmatism.
Peirce, James and Dewey energized the movement through the views they
shared:
One of the main features of pragmatism, which comes out not only in
Peirce but also in James and Dewey and their followers, is that it is a
'dynamic philosophy. In contrast to philosophers like Plato and Descartes
who adopt the standpoint of a pure intelligence in contemplation of
eternal verities, the pragmatists put themselves in the position of an
enquirer adapting himself to and helping to modify a changing world.-'
Differences of approach enriched the movement. "Dewey's own focus was
not so much on the methods of the natural sciences (as with Peirce) or on
the life-situation of the individual (as with James), but more on issues of
social theory, politics and law.' ' 4
Contemporary philosophers and legal scholars find instrumentalism (Dew-
ey's particular form of pragmatism) particularly appealing because, as
Morton White describes it, instrumentalism "holds that ideas are plans of
action, and not mirrors of reality; that dualisms of all kinds are fatal; that
the method of intelligence is the best way of solving problems; and that
philosophy ought to free itself from metaphysics and devote itself to social
engineering.' ' 49
James, the first of the three to reach prominence, strongly supported
the work of Peirce and Dewey until his retirement from Harvard.3 0
Despite disagreements within the group' 5' and attacks from the
146. Peirce, James and Dewey were pragmatists, although the term is most frequently
applied to Peirce and James. Dewey's work is called in addition instrumental, functional or
experimentalist. See, e.g., E. FLOWER & M. MunrPHY, supra note 144, at 819 (describing
Dewey as having developed "his functionalism into the mature instrumentalism which is his
version of pragmatism"); M. WHrr, PRAG Ans m AND THE AmERicAN MND 51 (1973)
(describing "the emergence of [Dewey's] distinctly instrumentalist, pragmatist, or experimen-
talist outlook"). For definitions and comparisons, see R. SuMMERs, supra note 45, at 20-22;
H.S. THAYER, supra note 144, at 421, 431; and Dewey, The Development of American
Pragmatism, in PRAGmATISM: THE CLAssIc WgrNGs, supra note 144, at 23-40.
147. A.J. AYER, supra note 144, at 5-6.
148. Grey, supra note 140, at 791.
149. M. WHrE, SocIAL TH OUGHT IN AmERIcA 7 (1957).
150. G. MYERs, supra note 145, at 42.
151. Personal differences have often been noted. E.g., 2 R. PERRY, THE THOUGHT "D
CHARACTER OF WILAM JAims 422 (1935) (examining the differences between Peirce and
James); H.S. THAYER, supra note 144, at 441-43 (exploring the differences between James and
Dewey). Peirce and Dewey strongly objected to James' justification of belief. See W. JAMEs,
THE WILL TO BELIEVE (1897).
James the psychologist and literary artist brilliantly described the working con-
sequences of types of religious belief for characteristic types of persons. But
[Peirce, Dewey and others contended that] James the philosopher tended to
confuse a descriptive analysis of how belief functions and why men believe with
questions of the evaluation or verification of specific cases of belief.
Thayer, Pragmatism, supra note 144, at 434.
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outside,5 2 pragmatism became a dynamic movement. It figured prominently
in philosophical discourse during the first third of this century, declined,
and enjoys a recent rebirth under the leadership of "neopragmatists" such
as Richard Rorty,15 3 Hillary Putnam14 and Richard Bernstein. 55
While their predecessors distrusted propositions that could not be verified
pragmatically, 156 neopragmatists incline toward pluralism. 7 This shift is due
in large part to the tendency of first-generation pragmatists to exaggerate
scientific method's capacity to clarify matters of rational belief and justi-
fication.'58 Neopragmatists are wary of scientific method 59 and attempt
more diffuse applications of pragmatism.' 60 Some critics have deemed the
enterprise a failure.' 6 ' Others, however, are attracted to neopragmatism and
believe it enhances the usefulness of pragmatism in jurisprudence. 162
152. See, e.g., Carnap, Truth and Confirmation, in READINGS IN PmLosoPmcAL ANALYSIS
(H. Feigi & W. Sellars eds. 1949); Russell, Dewey's New Logic, in THE PHILosoPHY OF JOHN
DEWEY (P.A. Schilpp ed. 1951). For a description of the attacks of Carnap, Russell and other
logical positivists on Dewey, see R. RoRTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAG ATIsM 74-76 (1982).
153. For some of Rorty's work treating pragmatism, see supra note 144.
154. See H. PuTrsm, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM (1987); H. PtrNAm, MEANING AND THE
MORAL SCIENCES (1978); H. PuTNAm, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981).
155. See, e.g., R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OB'cnisM AND RELATivisM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-
TIcs, AND PRAxis (1983); R. BERNST=I, P~nosoPmcAL PROFLEs: ESSAYS IN A PRAomATIC
MODE (1986).
156. Cf. Ezorsky, supra note 144, at 430 ("Dewey claimed that assertions become true when
they are verified.").
157. West, The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism, in PosT-ANALYTIc PmIosoPHY 260,
261-66 (J. Rajchman & C. West eds. 1985). Thus:
Rorty asserts ... that no one discipline, culture, or time has a privileged view
of knowledge or the truth. No framework exists within the human mind that the
philosopher can inspect to determine the rules of rationality. Instead, rationality
and justification are social phenomena; different shared standards of rationality
and justification exist not only within each culture but within each academic
discipline studied in a culture. Moreover, these rules change over time.
Stick, supra note 140, at 340.
158. See Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1811 (1990); cf. Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1727 (1990) (suggesting
early pragmatists were unduly influenced by Darwin). This is most true concerning Peirce and
Dewey. James suggested a variety of pluralism by which individual traits of behavior could
more easily be recognized. W. JAmEs, A PLURALISTC UNIvERSE (1909).
159. See H. PuTNAm, REASoN, TRUTH AND HISTORY 188-200 (1981); R. RORTY, CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 191-95 (1982); cf. H. PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REAiM 72
(1987) (emphasis in original) ("My own view, to be frank, is that there is no such thing as
the scientific method.").
160. For an exegesis on the work of Richard Rorty in this regard, see Stick, supra note
140.
161. See Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARv. L. REv. 555,
560 (1989) (suggesting Rorty's pluralism makes his philosophy incoherent).
162. Neopragmatism's philosophical shift, see supra note 158 and accompanying text, seems
to have supported a pluralistic attitude among several pragmatist legal theorists. The latter
note the capacity of pragmatism to contribute as a mode of legal thought within larger, loose-
textured settings and to mediate clashes between other phenomena. E.g., Grey, Hear the Other
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990); Grey,
supra note 140, at 789-91; Radin, supra note 140.
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Intersections with law date from the outset of the pragmatist movement.
Dewey took an interest in legal subjects. 63 Some trained in law actively
supported pragmatism. Peirce said that he developed the outlines of prag-
matism through lively meetings of the informal Metaphysical Club in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Among the regular and significant contributors
to discussion at Club meetings, Peirce listed Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
and Harvard law graduates Joseph Warner and Nicholas St. John Green.
1
'
Holmes, perhaps the leading figure in American jurisprudence, not only
admired some of the work of pragmatist philosophers' 65 but wrote in a
spirit closely allied with pragmatism. 16
Pragmatism carried great appeal for many twentieth century legal reform-
ers. 67 Pragmatist tenets frequently appeared in the work of Roscoe Pound'"
and of legal critics in the Realist movement. 69 By the time its popularity
163. See Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655 (1926); Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cosu. L.Q. 17 (1924); Dewey, Austin's
Theory of Sovereignty, 9 PoL. Sci. Q. 31 (1894). For a critique of the first, see Patterson,
Dewey's Theories of Legal Reasoning and Valuation, in Jom DEWEY: PHiosoPER OF SCIENCE
AND FREEDoM-A SYmposIuM 119 (S. Hook ed. 1950).
164. P. WIENER, supra note 144, at 19.
165. Holmes greatly admired Dewey's work. See P. WINNER, supra note 144, at 186-87;
Grey, supra note 140, at 788. He did not feel the same enthusiasm for the writing of Peirce
or for James' later work. Fisch, Justice Holmes, the Prediction Theory of Law, and Prag-
matism, 39 J. Pm.. 85, 96 (1942); see also H. POHUAAN, JusicE OLrVER WENDELL Hous
& UTIAUAN JUIMSPRUDNCE 163-64 (1984).
166. Many commentators have argued that, while Holmes may have disliked the term, there
was a good deal of pragmatism in his philosophy of law. Professor Hantzis suggested an
affinity between Holmes and Peirce. Hantzis, supra note 140. Fisch and Grey stressed an
affinity between Holmes and Dewey. Fisch, supra note 165; Grey, supra note 140, at 788. So
did Morton White, adding that "Dewey, Holmes, and Veblen were the leaders of a campaign
to mop up the remnants of formal logic, classical economics and jurisprudence in America,
and to emphasize that the life of science, economics, and law was not logic but experience in
some streaming social sense." M. W E, supra note 149, at 11-12. But see H. PO.MAN,
supra note 165, at 80-105, 163-64 (arguing similarities between Holmes' approach and that of
analytical positivist John Austin, and that pragmatism was largely absent from Holmes'
philosophy).
167. According to one scholar:
In pragmatism, human beings, their purposes, and their actions occupy the central
position in the universe. The very word "pragmatism" signifies an act, deed, or
affair. It can hardly be surprising, then, that when this philosophy became
prominent in America, legal theorists came to see law more as an instrument for
human use than as an abstract object for disinterested analysis and study.
R. Sutmos, supra note 45, at 31.
168. D. WIODOR, supra note 24, at 183-205; cf. Golding, supra note 50, at 450 (describing
Pound's "Jamesian pragmatism"). For example, Professor Bone noted the pragmatist tenor
of Pound's arguments for procedural reform. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 1, 93 & n.319 (1989); see, e.g., Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 408 (1906) (deploring the "[u]ncertainty,
delay and expense, and above all the injustice of deciding cases upon points of practice").
169. On the legacy of pragmatism for legal realists, see L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALiSM AT YALE
16-17 (1986); W. RuzIELE, AmmCAN LEGAL REALisM 4-8 (1968); and Summers, supra note
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peaked shortly before the Second World War, 170 pragmatism was arguably
a discrete jurisprudential movement. Professor Summers described prag-
matism this way:
First, it conceives the primary task of legal theory to be the provision
of a coherent body of ideas about law which will make law more
valuable in the hands of officials .... Second, [it takes the view] that
legal rules and other forms of law are most essentially tools devised to
serve practical ends .... Third, [it focuses] on the instrumental facets
of legal phenomena, including: the nature, variety, and complexity of
the goals law may serve; law's implementive machinery; the kinds of
means-goal relationships in the law; the variety of legal tasks that
officials must fulfill to translate law into practice, the efficacy of law;
and its limits.1'1
B. Features Setting Pragmatist Legal Theory Apart
1. Pragmatism Versus Historical Jurisprudence
Strong ties link historicism and pragmatist conceptions of learning,
planning and progress. Morton White defined historicism as "the attempt
to explain facts by reference to earlier facts." 172 Historicism clearly tikes
in more than the pragmatist movement.'7 3 Yet its importance to pragmatism
140, at 864-65. Cf. D. WIGDOR, supra note 24, at 261 (noting "the realists' extremely pragmatic
angle of vision"); W. TWlnNG, KARL LLnwE.LxN AND TH REALisT Movmsmrr 423 (1973).
Llewellyn's private ambition, as he once confessed in a lecture, was to perform
the role of a Dewey in jurisprudence, trying to do for law what the great man
had done for other subjects. The most pleasing compliment that could be paid
to Llewellyn was to compare him to John Dewey.
Id.
Pound held many views in common with realists Llewellyn and Jerome Frank. White, From
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-
Century America, 58 VA. L. Rnv. 999, 1020 (1972). Yet, while Pound was a frequent inspiration
for realists, he was uncomfortable within their circle. Pound publicly decried the lengths to
which they carried some of their antiformalist attacks. Realists often resented him in return.
Descriptions of this troubled relationship appear in D. WiODOR, supra note 24, at 255-67, and
L. Kumm, supra, at 46.
170. Realists were by then the conservators of pragmatism, and damaging associations with
Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy pulled down legal realism. The associations came from
(characteristically pragmatist) disavowal in realist writing of the relation between the authority
of law and a higher conception of morality. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 279, 282 (1973). Attempts by
Llewellyn and Frank to save the movement by revising their positions came too late. See id.
at 283. Later, cold war tensions kept the perceived relativism of realists out of favor. Id. at
284.
171. R. Sumiaas, supra note 45, at 20.
172. M. Win=, supra note 149, at 12. He expounds on this epigram in White, The Logic
of Historical Narration, in PILosopHY AND HIsTORY 3-31 (S. Hook ed. 1963).
173. See generally J. Mnu.aR, Tim PmiosopHY oF HxsroRY 3-31 (1981); TE PmI.osopHy oF
HISroRY IN ouR Tim 28-87 (H. Meyerhoff ed. 1959).
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is clear . 74 Dewey recognized a bond between historicism and his emphasis
on problem solving as a basis for knowledge and intellectual growth. 75
The focal importance of historicism has also been recognized (if not yet
completely explained) in pragmatist legal theory. 7 6
Helpful in separating pragmatism from historical jurisprudence is the
distinction between the former's use of historicism and the latter's use of
history. The historical school of jurisprudence believed that history, in-
formation about the past gathered and organized, 177 defined and often
limited legal authority. 7 8 Pragmatism no more accepts the constraints of
history than those of any other conceptual system which, as such, are
extrinsic to law in application. On the other hand, historicism in the sense
intended here sustains pragmatism because it is the means by which
pragmatists use history to acquire data about human experience. 79 For
the pragmatist, historical data informs the activity of identifying and
solving problems.1' °
2. Pragmatism Versus Natural Law
The categorical difference between pragmatism and natural law' was
evident from the beginning of the former. Peirce, James and Dewey
174. See H.S. THAYER, supra note 144, at 431 (describing among "the formative doctrines
of pragmatism," the theory "that all knowledge is evaluative of future experience and that
thinking functions experimentally in anticipations of future experiences and consequences of
actions-thus organizing in conditions of future observations and experience").
175. As one source has noted:
"With respect to logical theory, there is no existential proposition which does
not operate either (1) as material for locating and delimiting a problem; or (2)
as serving to point to an inference that may be drawn with some degree of
probability; or (3) as aiding to weigh the evidential value of some data; or (4)
as supporting and testing some conclusion hypothetically made."
THE PifLosoPHY oF HISTORY IN OuR TImm, supra note 173, at 164 (quoting J. DEwEY, THE
THEORY oF INQTiRY 232 (1938)). Thus, Dewey concluded, "the writing of history is an instance
of judgment as a resolution through inquiry of a problematic situation." Id.; see also J.
DEWEY, Humsw NATURE Am) CONDUCT 281-88 (Modem Library ed. 1957).
176. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 140, at 789 n.l1; Hutchinson, supra note 161; cf. H.
Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyian Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1671 (1990) (describing
Dewey's "historicist universalist" political theory).
177. However value judgments color the work of historians, their function remains largely
one of reporting events. Cf. 1 A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY oF HISTORY 15 (D.C. Somervell abr.
Laurel ed. 1965) ("Historians generally illustrate rather than correct the ideas of the commu-
nities within which they live and work. .. ").
178. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
179. But see Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981). Professor
Gordon offers a different conception of historicism, one closer to historical jurisprudence. He
deplores the former as "a perpetual threat to the alms of our legal scholarship." Id. at 1017.
Some scholars have simply used the term in discussing historical jurisprudence. Berman, supra
note 24, at 780; Grey, supra note 140, at 808. This all suggests that historicism is hardly a
term of art.
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 62-96 and accompanying text.
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rejected moral abstractions,8 2 as they did abstractions generally.183 Dewey
expressed this view in his writing on law, deploring courts' "confusion of
theoretical certainty and practical certainty.' 8 4 Logical theory, Dewey
wrote, should be understood as "a theory about empirical phenomena,
subject to grorth and improvement like any other empirical discipline."'' 8 5
Facts of human experience were to Dewey "the empirical raw material of
legal theory.' '18 6
Under the early influence of pragmatism, several legal theorists were
openly hostile toward natural law theories. Holmes was "sharply critical
of natural law theorizing." 18 7 Pound, too, "maintained that there was no
'absolute formula' for assigning values to the different interests in partic-
ular cases and thus no set of general principles that could support deduc-
tively derived legal decisions in all cases."' 8 8 Members of the realist
movement also attacked natural law principles. 89
3. Pragmatism Versus Analytical Positivism
Because pragmatism includes a "major positivist tenet[]" that "law and
morals must be sharply separated,"'' 9 it may not be as easy to distinguish
pragmatism from analytical positivism. 91 This may account for the de-
scription of aspects of pragmatism or instrumentalism as positivist, for
the argument whether Holmes is a pragmatist or an analytical positivist,
92
and for a certain terminological ambiguity in the emerging literature on
pragmatism in statutory interpretation.1
93
182. Cf. Hurst, The Unfinished Work of the Instrumentalists, 82 McH. L. REv. .852, 853
(1984) ("Pragmatic analysts shy off from the unacceptable vagueness or rationalizations of
undisclosed premises they find in appeals to natural law.").
183. See Ezorsky, supra note 144, at 427-30.
184. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 17, 25 (1924) (emphasis in original).
185. Id. at 27.
186. Id. at 19.
187. R. ATiYA & R. SuimmRs, supra note 51, at 246. "Holmes frequently insisted that he
had 'no criterion [sc., of right and wrong] except what the crowd wants."' Id. at 252 (brackets
in original). See generally F. BmDLE, JusncE Hom.ms, NATAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1961); H. PoHimAN, supra note 165, at 14-16.
188. Bone, supra note 168, at 95. Pound considered natural law "a serious barrier to
modernity in law." D. WIGDOR, supra note 24, at 167.
189. W. RUmBLE, supra note 169, at 230-32; Golding, supra note 50, at 452-53. In the view
of one commentator, this was to prove the movement's undoing. See supra note 170.
190. P. ATrYAH & R. SumEzs, supra note 51, at 246. See generally H.L.A. HART, supra
note 46, at 181-207 (chapter entitled "Laws and Morals").
191. See the earlier description of analytical positivism at supra notes 47-60 and accompa-
nying text. Cf. R. SumaEas, supra note 45, at 42 (observing that "Bentham and John Austin
and the pragmatist philosophers (particularly William James)" shared "a theory that may be
characterized as utilitarian, quantitative, conventionalist, and majoritarian in tenor").
192. See supra note 166.
193. The term "practical reason" is offered to describe a pragmatic approach to statutory
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The difference between pragmatism and analytical positivism clears,
however, if one keeps in mind that the latter (like natural law, but in an
entirely different way) is highly theoretical. "Analytical positivists have
analyzed the basic concepts that figure in a system of law including rule,
right, duty, sanction, and sovereign." 194 Ultimately, then, analytical pos-
itivism is couched in abstractions that pragmatism finds as irrelevant to
the "law in action" as that found in historical jurisprudence or natural
law.
4. Pragmatism's Frailties
These foregoing comparisons suggest that it is easier to grasp what
pragmatism is not. Some may wonder whether pragmatism really has much
of its own to offer jurisprudence. Holmes' retort, that 'judging the law
by its effects and results did not have to wait for W[illiam] J[ames]," ' ' 9
was one with which James would have agreed. 196 Another observer noted
that "[w]e were all Deweyites before we read Dewey.' ' 97 Doubters might
suggest for pragmatism the following dilemma.
Pragmatism, particularly the Deweyian side most influential today, 98 is
designed around the process of finding and solving problems. 199 But what
interpretation in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 322 n.3; and Sunstein, supra note 19,
at 498. The term, however, also has a different meaning, chiefly from the work of analytical
positivist Joseph Raz. See J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NoRMs (1975); J. RAz, PRAcTlcAL
R.EASONIG (1978). Characteristic of analytical positivism, and unlike pragmatism, this work
has a strong element of theoretical detachment. Cf. MacCormick, Symposium: The Works of
Joseph Raz-Preface, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 743, 743 (1989) ("Raz's approach to jurisprudence
was informed at the deepest level by the need to conceptualise law, laws and legal institu-
tions .... ). For illustrations, see M. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 55-60 (1984); and Burton,
Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 747 (1989). But cf. Singer, Should Lawyers Care
About Philosophy?, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1752, 1754 & n.8 (suggesting that the "practical reasoning"
characterization of the Eskridge & Frickey article ties it to "[t]he conservative flavor of Rorty's
version of pragmatism").
194. R. SumzERs, supra note 45, at 20.
195. H. PoHImAN, supra note 165, at 163 (quoting 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LErrERS 20 (M. Howe
ed. 1953) (brackets in original)).
196. James "soft-pedaled the newness of the theory." G. MYERS, supra note 145, at 299.
This is evident from the subtitle of one book. W. JAMEs, PRAG MATSm: A NEw NhmE FOR
SoME OLD WAYS OF THmKING (1907).
197. The statement continued, "'and we were all the more effective reformers after we had
read him."' W. RurmmiE, supra note 169, at 8 (quoting J. Allen Smith).
198. See Grey, supra note 140, at 791.
199. Dewey described the essence of his approach through the following sketch:
We compare life to a traveler faring forth. We may consider him first at a
moment where his activity is confident, straightforward, organized. He marches
on giving no direct attention to his path, nor thinking of his destination. Abruptly
he is pulled up, arrested. Something is going wrong in his activity. From the
standpoint of an onlooker, he has met an obstacle which must be overcome
before his behavior can be unified into a successful ongoing. From his own
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are'the problems? How, when and why do we define them? Pragmatism
is often thought to eschew moral (substantive) values, 2°° but it must have
a moral base somewhere to escape relativism. That is, pragmatism can
neither call something a problem nor value one solution to it over another
without substantive reference points. Hence the dilemma. If pragmatism
is substantive, does it contradict itself?20 If pragmatism lacks substantive
reference, is it not hopelessly relativistic? 202 In the wake of these difficul-
ties, is what remains of pragmatism little more than an appeal to "common
sense"-at best an analytic muddle23 and at worst a mask for substantive
injustice? 2°4
It would be difficult to argue that these concerns leave pragmatist legal
theory unscathed. Certainly they help to account for present disparities in
describing and applying legal pragmatism within the academy. 203 But one
particular development has perhaps saved pragmatist theory from the
pitfalls of incoherence or trivialism (the horns of the dilemma above) and
opened the way for its usefulness as a freestanding jurisprudence: the
movement's pluralistic shift.201 Of course there is more to pluralism in
standpoint, there is shock, confusion, perturbation, uncertainty. For the moment
he doesn't know what hit him ... nor where he is going. But a new impulse is
stirred which becomes the starting point of an investigation, a looking into things,
a trying to see them, to find out what is going on. Habits which were interfered
with begin to get a new direction as they cluster about the impulse to look and
see. The blocked habits of locomotion give him a sense of where he was going,
of what he had set out to do, and of the ground already traversed. As he looks,
he sees definite things which are not just things at large but which are related
to his course of action. The momentum of the activity entered upon persists as
a sense of direction, of aim; it is an anticipatory project. In short, he recollects,
observes and plans.
J. DEwEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT, supra note 175, at 181-82 (emphasis in original).
200. See supra notes 147, 149, 156, 167, 170, 182, 187, 188 and accompanying text.
201. See Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653 (1990).
202. That is, does it see one result as good as another? Compare Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. J105,
1120 (1989) (questioning what he describes as Rorty's "purely relativist view") with R. RoRrY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PaMsTIM 166-69 (1982) (arguing why pragmatism as he sees it is not
relativistic).
203. A risk acknowledged in Grey, supra note 162, and a point of attack against Rorty's
pragmatism in Hutchinson, supra note 161.
204. For expressions of this concern see Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
1597 (1990); Singer, supra note 193, at 1754-55.
205. See generally Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought,
63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990) (contributions by H. Putnam, Radin, Michaelman, Rorty,
Brewer, Posner, Grey, Wells, R. Putnam, Singer, Minow and Spelman, West, Smiley and
Matsuda).
206. This view of opportunities offered by pluralism in neopragmatist philosophy suggests
that, perhaps along with some other commentators, see supra note 162, I may be more hopeful
about uses of pragmatism than neopragmatist philosophers have at times been themselves. See,
for example, the discussion of Rorty's skepticism in Stick, supra note 140, at 338-41.
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contemporary usage than pragmatism, 20 7 and vice versa. 208 Yet pluralism
207. Pluralism merely rejects the view that thought or being can be reduced to a single
concept (monism), or to two balancing concepts (dualism). Hall, Monism and Pluralism, in 5
Tim ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILosoPHY 363-64 (P. Edwards ed. 1972). Pluralism may grow out of
optimism, a goal for enriching opportunities in an organized society. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JusTIcE IN THE LmERAL STATE 41-42 (1980); J. SmuIAR, LEGALISM vii-xi (2d ed. 1986); cf.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1188 (1990) (noting how "the unencumbered interplay
of different perspectives and the competing demands of different interest groups are associated
with democracy in pluralist thought"). Or a darker, reverse image of pluralism may suggest
a more disturbing visage, a condition where society is stalled in reaching formal understandings
because of the indeterminacy of language and rules. The work of deconstructionist Jacques
Derrida figures here. See, e.g., J. DERR DA, DISSEMINATION (1981); J. DERRmA, POSITIONS
(1981). Although Den-ida would not acknowledge that the indeterminacy of language results
in a stalled social condition-his work in fact celebrates indeterminacy-many have found
Derrida's nihilism disturbing. See, e.g., A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 379
(1987) (reading deconstruction as "the last, predictable, stage in the suppression of reason and
the denial of the possibility of truth"); Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. Rnv. 1656,
1683-85 (1986) (arguing that Derrida's methodology, what Luban calls "avant-gardism,"
"imposes unlivable, deceptive, and spiritually destructive requirements on us."). The same
may be said of the works of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. See, e.g., S. KRiKE,
WITTOENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRrvATE LANGUAoE (1982); P.F. STEAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND
NATURALiSM (1985); L. WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSoPaCAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans.
1953); Bralnerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinan Look at Language, Structuralism,
and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U.L. Rv. 1231 (1985).
Yet Wittgenstein's writing is difficult to fathom, and "no view can be attributed to him
uncontroversially." Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. Rnv. 781, 783 n.8
(1989). For less dissonant readings of Wittgenstein, see id.; and Eisele, Wittgenstein's Instructive
Narratives: Leaving the Lessons Latent, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 77 (1990). Affinities clearly exist
between Wittgenstein's work and pragmatism. Patterson, supra note 140. Rorty has written
that "the later Wittgenstein belongs with Dewey as much as the earlier Wittgenstein belongs
with Kant." R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 28 (1982). On ties between Wittgenstein
and James, see H.S. THIAYER, supra note 144, at 313. On ties between Wittgenstein and Peirce,
see A.J. AYER, supra note 144, at 5.
A LEXIS search of law reviews currently on line (about 40) confirmed Wittgenstein's
attraction for legal scholars. A comparison of the number of articles citing Wittgenstein with
the number referring to one of traditional legal theory's hardiest perennials, United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), yielded the following:
Wittgenstein Carolene Products
1990 (through Oct. 22) 14 17 (1)
1989 35 34 (6)
1988 35 36 (9)
1987 35 38 (10)
1986 22 28 (6)
1985 24 23 (6)
Carolene Products did this well only because I included in the total (and separately in
parentheses) articles that did not cite it but did cite Professor Ackerman's article about the
case, Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HAv. L. REv. 713 (1985).
208. If the pluralism of latter-day pragmatism is crucial to the application of pragmatism
attempted in this Article, so too are the direct contributions of James and Dewey. James'
influence appears, for example, in the supple, methodological approach attempted in this
Article to accommodate different configurations of statutory interpretation arguments. "James-
ian pragmatism as a philosophy of law meant that legal rules and precedents should be thought
of as guides to decision rather than rigid prescriptions governing fixed categories." Golding,
supra note 50, at 450 (emphasis in original). Dewey's instrumentalism, see supra note 149 and
accompanying text, provides this Article's critical thrust.
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is of great importance to pragmatist theory and to application in this
Article of the idea that pragmatism is enhanced rather than threatened by
the value of other approaches.
Imagine intentionalism, plain meaning and political interpretation as a
larger context" or community of potential approaches to statutory inter-
pretation viewed through a pragmatist lens. Pragmatism concerns itself with
results, with the instrumental effectiveness and interaction of these ap-
proaches in particular applications. Do they promote coherence in the law?
Are there more beneficial ways in the instant case or the legal system overall
for producing the same ends? Pragmatism thus may escape the dilemma
noted above because, while having no substantive content of its own, it
subsists by clarifying or mediating substantive impulses originating within
one or more other approaches. 21
0
C. A Pragmatist Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Will
This Article does not suggest that a pragmatist approach to statutory
interpretation would be greatly important to every case. Nor does it attempt
to inventory all of the ways in which a pragmatist approach might aid in
discerning whether one reading of a statute is more appealing than another.
I attempt to demonstrate, however, how a pragmatist approach can be
useful, and how it would have been in Will, by providing a separate basis
for choosing between the contending political readings of section 1983, or
by mediating the political conflict. As I examine these matters, it will be
useful to review how things now stand.
1. The Current Landscape21 '
Will established that states are no more exposed to section 1983 suits in
state court than they had been in federal court. Prior to Will, states were
protected from greater federal court exposure by eleventh amendment doc-
trine. After Will, states receive the same protection in state and federal
court by the failure of "person" as used in section 1983 to include states
or state officials sued for damages in official capacities. At the same time,
states after Will remain about as exposed to section 1983 suits in federal
court as they had been before.2 1 2 By characterizing the relief sought as
209. Context is an important theme in pragmatist legal theory. See, e.g., Minow & Spelman,
supra note 204. The meaning of context in this setting is different from that for the term in
statutory interpretation. On the latter, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
210. For a description of the substantive character of intentionalist, plain meaning and
political approaches to statutory interpretation, see supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
212. The only exception concerns an insignificant number of cases where states by waiver
or consent could have exposed themselves to § 1983 suits, had Will not read them out of the
statute. For descriptions and examples of this situation before Will, see E. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 117, at 419-20, and 13B C. WimGHr, A. MnaaR & E. CooPER, supra note 94, §
3573.1, at 202.
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prospective rather than retroactive, Will read into section 1983 cases which
previously had been placed beyond the protection of the eleventh amend-
ment.
Recall how the exhaustion of opportunities for statutory interpretation
under the trio of approaches discussed earlier in this Article 13 left the
Supreme Court hanging in Will. The Court could have decided the case as
an act of judicial reasoning if material existed for an intentionalist reading
of section 1983.214 The same might also have been true under a plain
language reading. 215 Because, however, neither of these approaches offered
a plausible basis for interpreting section 1983,216 the Justices were left with
warring moral/political choices of how to read the statute. Congress could
have favored either result in considering whether to amend the section. 217
Yet the same choice created a quandary for the Supreme Court, since one
option appeared no less attractive than the other through the process of
judicial reasoning. 21
2. Which Result Promotes More Coherence? Pragmatism
as a Means for Taking Sides in Will
In exploring pragmatism as a fourth approach to statutory interpretation,
I will begin by accepting at face value a point upon which the majority
and dissent in Will seem to agree: that their conflicting interpretations of
"person" in section 1983 entailed significant and differing consequences for
the balance between federalism and federal law enforcement in future
litigation under the statute. A pragmatist inquiry proceeding from this
supposition might be whether either of these results would have produced
as an additional consequence more settled law.219 If one would, a way out
213. See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (discussing intentionalism, plain meaning
and political interpretation).
214. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 28-31, 92 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
219. A challenge might occur here that pragmatists would value law's settling effects least
of all, that they would be interested in the results of particular cases in isolation rather than
in rules. Skepticism of realists (in many respects influenced by pragmatism, see supra note
169) toward rules might seem to support this. See, e.g., Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 Burr.Ao L. REv.
195 (1980). However, the problem with such a challenge is that it overlooks both the
instrumental value legal pragmatism attaches to the effective operation of courts as a whole,
see supra note 168, and the importance Dewey assigned to rules as a means of standardizing
growth and improvement through human experience. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10
CORNELL L.Q. 17, 19, 27 (1924). Dewey sought a balance here:
It is most important that rules of law should form as coherent generalized logical
systems as possible. But these logical systemizations of law in any field ... are
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of the quandary may exist. The choices facing the Supreme Court in Will
would no longer appear equally impoverished, for coherence and stability-
in law is a goal of judicial reasoning m Coherence as a pragmatist value
encompasses both coherence in law's theoretical justification and relative
ease of law's application.2 1 I will attempt to suggest why the Court's options
differ at this level, and why excluding states from section 1983 makes law
more coherent overall.
First, Will works one positive effect exclusively on federal litigation.
The decision obviates the most egregious applications of unstable
eleventh amendment doctrine originating in Hans v. Louisiana.222 In
Hans the Supreme Court invoked the eleventh amendment to bar
federal courts from hearing suits brought against unconsenting
states by their own citizens. Hans'. notoriety stems from the great
difficulty in squaring this ruling with the language of the amend-
ment.2 3 Many commentators feel that Hans should be overruled, 224 and
clearly in last resort subservient to the economical and effective reaching of
decisions in particular cases.
J. DE , PmosopHx AND C r OvzAioN 129 (1931). "Dewey was influenced by Holmes and
Pound, and he never associated himself with the realists. Attention to Dewey's approach would
have saved the last from extreme and untenable statements that denigrate the role of logic in
the law." Golding, supra note 50, at 467.
220. See, e.g., G. Cmustna, supra note 46, at 44-82; L. Fuu Ea, supra note 67, at 81-82;
N. MAcCoMEcK, supra note 46, at 152-94; see also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying
text.
221. See J. DEwEY, supra note 219; Dewey, supra note 219.
222. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
223. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
There is simply no room in this text to fit citizen suits like Hans. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); Shreve, supra note 108, at 608-
10. As Professor Lawrence Marshall wrote of Hans and related decisions, "it is ... difficult
to think of any other facet of the Constitution with respect to which the Court has reached
results so obviously inconsistent with the words used by the framers." Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HAuv. L. Ray. 1342, 1345 (1989). Similarly, bleak
appraisals are numerous. See, e.g., L. TRmE, AmuwcAN CoNsrnUoNAL LAW 173 (2d ed.
1987); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1467 (1987); Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STA. L. Ra,. 1033,
1044 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1889, 1891 (1983).
224. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply
to Critics, 56 U. Cm. L. Ray. 1261 (1989); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Shapiro, Wrong Turns:
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61 (1984). But see
Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HAav.
L. Ray. 1372, 1375 (1989) (taking the position that "[tihe ninety-nine years of jurisprudence
built upon Hans creates a presumption in favor of the current interpretation of state immunity,"
and that the attack against Hans is not strong enough to overcome that presumption).
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four Justices on the Supreme Court have expressed their desire to do
so 225
Despite Will, and despite a recent strengthening of Congress' authority
to abrogate the eleventh amendment, 226 Hans remains a sore point.227 But
Hans' greatest impact probably was on real or potential litigation under
section 1983. This was measurable in part by the proportion of section 1983
cases among those affected by Hans,22s and in part by the disturbing
impression that the Supreme Court had, by turning the language of the
eleventh amendment inside out, placed damage recovery just out of the
reach of plaintiffs suing states for violations of federal rights.?29
Will dispelled that impression. Hans will not be overruled in the foresee-
able future;230 however, that dubious decision will no longer dominate federal
civil rights litigation. That may be cold comfort to plaintiffs as frustrated
in federal court after Will as before. This merely demonstrates, however,
the persistence of political arguments for and against state amenability to
suit.231 What changes is the emergence of a nonpolitical, pragmatist argument
225. In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), Justice Stevens joined
dissenters Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall to urge that Hans be overruled to permit citizen
suits without eleventh amendment interference. The group has often reiterated its position
since. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1990) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
226. In Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2273, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' authority
under the commerce clause of the Constitution to abrogate the eleventh amendment by exposing
states to suit. The Court recognized such authority for Congress prior to Union Gas, but
perhaps only for statutes based on § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Union Gas does not
resolve the question whether Congress' abrogation power extends to the full reach of its
legislative competence, but that power now seems considerable. See generally Note, Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas: Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under the
Commerce Clause, or, Living With Hans, 58 FoRDRA L. Ray. 513 (1989). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari in another case involving the commerce clause and the eleventh
amendment. Hoffman v. Native Village of Noatak, 59 U.S.L.W. 3213 (Oct. 2, 1990).
227. In Dellmuth, 109 S. Ct. at 2397, 2401 n.2, a five-justice majority followed Hans in
blocking a citizen suit based on the Federal Education of the Handicapped Act. For post-Will
discussions of Hans, see Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh
Amendment?: Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C.L. Ray. 867 (1990);
Chemerinsky, supra note 118, at 339-43; and Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process
Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DE PAuL L. Ray. 345 (1990).
228. See, e.g., Green, 474 U.S. at 64; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Of course, a full measure of harm must include Hans-based
decisions in lower federal courts and the dampening effect of Hans on decisions whether to
file civil rights damage actions in federal court at all.
229. Cf. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 365 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that
to subject federal § 1983 suits to the eleventh amendment denies claimants the range of
remedies provided in the statute).
230. Chemerinsky, supra note 118, at 331.
231. See supra notes 102-130 and accompanying text; cf. Brown, supra note 227, at 871
("Ba lancing concerns of national supremacy with concerns of state sovereignty can never be
done to the satisfaction of both sides.").
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that supports Will: law becomes more coherent by excluding states from
section 1983 because decision in a significant category of cases no longer
turns on a bogus reading of constitutional text. 2
It is perhaps ironic that it is easiest to demonstrate how Will, a state
case, lends coherence to federal litigation. The picture grows more compli-
cated when one examines Will's practical consequences for state proceedings.
In this analysis, the pragmatist focus shifts from coherence of the theoretical
underpinning for a rule (the problem in Hans) to coherence in a law's
application. This inquiry proceeds with the question of whether the Court's
or the dissent's interpretation of "person" in Will is more likely to generate
uncertainty in state court litigation under section 1983?
In these terms, one must acknowledge that the most obvious effects of
Will on state litigation are those counting against it. By aligning section
1983 with eleventh amendment doctrine, Will seems to introduce into state
litigation uncertainties afflicting the latter. Three distinctions derived from
the Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence, which have been elusive in
content and perplexing in application, now hover over state litigation under
section 1983: state versus municipal defendants,23 retroactive versus pro-
spective relief234 and official-capacity versus personal-capacity defendants. 235
State courts may have already been accustomed in part to these distinc-
tions,2 6 but one can expect some upheaval as a result of Will. If states
232. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 93. The distinction is not altogether rational, since the distribution of
functions between states and municipalities (or other political subdivisions) varies greatly.
Moreover, certain entities have been difficult to classify. See, e.g., Clague, Suing the University
"Black Box" Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 62 IowA L. REv. 337 (1976). Finally, this
distinction may even frustrate suits against municipalities, depending upon whether an unreach-
able state defendant is deemed to be indispensable to the lawsuit. See Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (a state protected by the eleventh amendment and
indispensable).
234. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. For discussion of problems with the
distinction in theory and in application, see Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal
Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. REs. L.
Rnv. 364 (1982).
235. The distinction is important because the liability of local or state officers acting in
their official capacities is likely to be pegged to that of their governmental unit. That exposure
is usually less than the same persons have when sued as individuals. S. NAHMOD, supra note
2, at § 6.14. The distinction can be elusive in application. Id. at § 6.04. For an example at
the state government level, see Graham, 473 U.S. at 159 (1985).
236. For example, many state courts use in their local sovereign immunity doctrines the
same distinction between prospective and retroactive relief that limits the eleventh amendment.
E.g., Etheredge v. Bradley, 480 P.2d 414, 416 (Alaska 1971); Washington v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 68 Haw. 192, 198, 708 P.2d 129, 133-34 (1985); Bio-Medical Lab., Inc. v. Trainor,
68 IIl. 2d 540, 548, 370 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1977); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of
Rep., 236 Kan. 45, 47-48, 687 P.2d 622, 626-27 (1984); State ex rel. Ferguson v. Shoemaker,
45 Ohio App. 2d 83, 87-92, 341 N.E.2d 311, 315-17 (1975); Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441,
444-46, 585 P.2d 12, 15-17 (1978); Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571,
575-77, 190 A.2d 111, 113-14 (1963); Stockton v. Morris & Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197, 201-03, 110
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were "person[s]" under section 1983, state courts would not have to struggle
with any of these matters in applying the statute.237
On the other side, the skein of possible consequences from the dissent's
reading of section 1983, that states are "person[s]" under section 1983, is
not easy to untangle. What can be said is that reading states into the statute
would have left additional questions concerning State damage liability for
disgruntled state courts to grapple with. Combined, these complications
might have been more unsettling than Will's actual effects on state'litigation.
Let us examine an important aspect of the picture easily overlooked. The
new subcategory of section 1983 law which would have followed the dissent's
reading of the statute would not have been administered by lower federal
courts. Instead, it would have been entrusted to state judges (with the
periodic intercession of the United States Supreme Court).23 Many state
judges would not approach this task with much enthusiasm, perplexed at a
reading of federal law denying them the same authority to protect their
states that federal judges have. 239
This is not to say that state judges would rebel by entertaining state
sovereign immunity as a defense to damage actions under section 1983. 24
But it is unlikely that these judges would be aggressive in filling any gaps
in the law necessary to facilitate enforcement of the statute.?4 If there were
S.W.2d 480, 482-83 (1937); Ables v. Mooney, 264 S.E.2d 424, 429-30 (W. Va. 1979); Metzger
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 132-34, 150 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1967); Rocky
Mt. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1982). But see Hurst v. Highway
Dep't, 16 Utah 2d 153, 154-56, 397 P.2d 71, 73-74 (1964) (rejecting the distinction and invoking
sovereign immunity to bar prospective as well as retroactive relief).
237. The beneficial effect of such a result in Will would be comparable to that generated
by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). By placing municipalities
within the scope of § 1983, Monell greatly eased problems which had existed in distinguishing
between official-capacity and individual-capacity municipal officers and between prospective
and retroactive relief. See S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, at §§ 6.01-.07.
238. Given the federal-question character of state litigation under § 1983, the United States
Supreme Court could be expected periodically to exercise its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
However, here as in other areas of federal law enforcement there would have been concern
whether the Court offered a sufficient prospect superintendence. Commentators have questioned
whether the Supreme Court can be counted upon to review enough cases. Stoltz, Federal
Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate
Capacity, 64 CAin'. L. Rv. 943 (1976); cf. Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National
Court, 100 HAkv. L. Rav. 1400, 1400 (1987) ("By any measure, the Supreme Court is
tremendously overburdened.").
239. Or the matter could be stated in terms of obligation. Federal judges would be obligated
under the eleventh amendment to honor state sovereign immunity in damage suits against
states, while state courts would be pressured under (the dissent's reading of) § 1983 to entertain
the same cases. The Court in Will noted this anomaly. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
109 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (1989).
240. It is clear that states may not interpose state law to defeat claims under § 1983. Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980). The principle
was reaffirmed in Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2437 (1990).
241. Irritation over the anomaly would add to the general reluctance of many state judges
to read federal law (here § 1983) as broadly or as sympathetically as federal judges might. See
supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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difficult issues unanswered by the dissent's opinion concerning aspects of
damage recovery against states, adoption of the dissent's reading of section
1983 would have left double uncertainty-the issues themselves and their
commitment to the reluctant stewardship of state courts. At least two
additional issues would remain: whether state courts might refuse jurisdic-
tion, and whether the developing content of section 1983 would in fact lead
to extensive damage recovery against states.
If states are persons under section 1983, actual damage recoveries would
follow only if state courts exercised jurisdiction over section 1983 claims.
Their authority to do so is settled. 2  The question is whether they are
obliged to exercise that authority, or are, instead, free to decline jurisdiction.
The supremacy clause gives states more leeway in deciding whether to take
jurisdiction over federal claims23 than in deciding how to interpret federal
law once they accept jurisdiction2 4 Until very recently, it was unclear when
or whether state jurisdiction over section 1983 actions was obligatory.25
The Supreme Court has now shed some light on the matter, requiring a
Florida state court to exercise jurisdiction over a section 1983 damage claim
against a municipality in Howlett v. Rose. 6
That case, however, leaves doubt about results under less compelling
circumstances. Even assuming Howlett would have been decided the same
way if Will had read "person[s]" to include states, at least two factors
limiting Howlett would make jurisdiction in damage suits against states
somewhat uncertain. First, Florida courts had already entertained section
1983 claims against individual officials;247 therefore, the Court cast Florida
in the position of having accepted jurisdiction in section 1983 cases and
sidestepped the issue of whether states could decline such jurisdiction
entirely?28 Second, Howlett placed weight on the fact that Florida courts
242. Jurisdiction over § 1983 claims does not rest exclusively in federal courts. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
243. See Liberman, State Sovereign Immunity in Suits to Enforce Federal Rights, 1977
W~sH. U.L.Q. 195, 195-96 (footnote omitted) ("State courts, contrary to a literal reading of
the supremacy clause, are not compelled to enforce federal rights except to the extent they
arise in connection with state law claims.").
244. See Note, State Remedies for Federally-Created Rights, 47 MINN. L. Rnv. 815, 817
(1963) ("[O]nce a state court assumes the adjudication of a cause of action, the supremacy
clause of the Constitution makes clear that the court's judgment must not conflict with
applicable federal law."); see also Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court
Findings in Cases Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. Rnv. 1281, 1303 (1978).
245. S. NAHMOD, supra note 2, § 1.13; S. STEINGLASS, supra note 3, §§ 9.1, 9.3.
246. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990). Howlett involved the possible refusal of a Florida state court
to take jurisdiction over a § 1983 damage case against a local school board and school
officials. The Supreme Court concluded that "the Florida court's refusal to entertain one
discrete category of § 1983 claims, when the court entertains similar state law actions against
state defendants, violates the Supremacy Clause." Id. at 2442.
247. Id. at 2444 & n.22.
248. The Court thus identified as an issue it would not decide "whether Congress can
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routinely entertained quite similar suits against municipalities based on state
tort law. 9
As a more basic matter, it is misleading to assume that the plaintiff
would have done as well if the reading of section 1983, available to the
Howlett Court, was that states were persons within the statute. Because
Will instead excluded states from section 1983 coverage, a unanimous Court
in Howlett was able to use the earlier case to soft-pedal the effect of its
decision, reminding readers that state sovereign immunity was built into
section 1983:
The anomaly identified by the State Supreme Court, and by the various
state courts which it cited, that a State might be forced to entertain in
its own courts suits from which it was immune in federal court, is thus
fully met by our decision in Will. Will establishes that the State and
arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment
immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court
or state court. 50
It is not so much that Howlett would have been decided differently if
Will had been. More likely, the Supreme Court would have denied certiorari
in Howlett, giving more leeway to states forced to deal with the "anom-
aly. "'251
require the States to create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights." Id.
at 2444. Since most state courts have recognized at least limited § 1983 jurisdiction, the
question now would likely be whether a state court can change its position and refuse to
recognize § 1983 jurisdiction altogether. Such a move would not be tantamount to denying
state court remedies for federal rights. State courts appear competent to fashion civil remedies
from their own law for this purpose. See Wolcher, supra note 8, at 234-35; cf. S. STEINGLASS,
supra note 3, at 9-15 (footnote omitted) ("even in cases in which states cannot be named as
defendants under § 1983, states may still be liable for federal constitutional violations in state-
created causes of action to enforce federal claims'").
Perhaps the Supreme Court would apply the "valid excuse" principle used in Howlett to
prevent Florida courts from discriminating between types of § 1983 jurisdiction, Howlett, 110
S. Ct. at 2444, and to prevent courts of a state from refusing § 1983 jurisdiction altogether.
Yet it is uncertain that the Court would or should do so. There is much to the argument that
an obligation on state courts to hear cases involving federal law should not be implied from
the mere fact of concurrent jurisdiction. Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate
State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 187. True, the Supreme
Court has not required a clear statement from Congress before requiring state courts to exercise
the jurisdiction they hold concurrently with lower federal courts. E.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386 (1947). But, since considerable effort was required to establish that state courts were even
competent to hear such cases, see S. STmNOLAss, supra note 3, 9-5 to 9-9, it seems more
difficult to argue that this form of concurrent jurisdiction is mandatory for them.
249. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2444-45. To the extent that state law might not contain a basis
for damage recovery against a state as defendant, an analog important to Howlett might be
absent.
250. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2437.
251. In its enormous discretion, the Supreme Court is certain to deny most certiorari
petitions, usually without giving a reason. It is therefore impossible to explain particular
certiorari denials. See R. STERN, E. GRzssmN & S. SHsmo, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE §§
5.5, 5.7 (6th ed. 1986); Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 1227,
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Because the actual decision in Will excluded states frem section 1983
coverage, it permitted the Court to avoid another difficult issue: the im-
munity states would have possessed when sued for damages. This question
is not whether states would have enjoyed an immunity defense in damage
actions under section 1983 but how extensive that defense would have
been. 252 The closest model under present law is found in the immunity
enjoyed by municipal governments. 2 I Neither could expect to enjoy absolute
immunity from damage actions, for that would negate a holding that they
were covered by section 1983. 254 Yet, had Will designated states as persons
under section 1983, states would seem at least as entitled as municipalities
to have their exposure under the statute limited.25
From early developments 256 until the present, 257 municipal immunity from
section 1983 damage liability has been a difficult and controversial issue.
Recent cases suggest that matters are still in flux.Ys At the same time, the
1251-55 (1979). Yet it seems clear that Justices can regard delay as a virtue. In what is perhaps
the most famous opinion on certiorari policy, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "It may be desirable
to have different aspects of an issue further illumined by the lower courts. Wise adjudication
has its own time for ripening." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918
(1950); see also R. PosNR, THE FEDERAL CouRrs 163 (1985).
252. Section 1983 makes no reference to government and government-official immunity;
however, the Supreme Court's view has most often been that Congress intended the statute to
conform around those immunities. E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638
(1980), reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980). The result has been to entertain as federal law
differing immunity defenses depending on the type of defendant, acts alleged and type of
relief sought. See 13B C. WIor, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 94, at § 3573.3;
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitu-
tional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. Rnv. 1, 5-17 (1974); Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity
Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights,
138 U. PA. L. Rnv. 23 (1989); Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Governmental
Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 945,
1021-60 (1980).
253. Cf. P. Low & J. JEFFRIES, CrvI RIGHns AcTIONs: SECTION 1983 AND RE.LATD STATUTES
79 (1988) (noting ways in which state liability under § 1983 would be similar to current
municipal liability).
254. See S. NARMOD, supra note 2, § 6.17, at 379.
255. For the suggestion that states might actually be entitled to more immunity, see infra
notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 93.
257. There has been a good deal of recent commentary. See, e.g., Brown, Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases,
27 B.C.L. Rnv. 883 (1986); Gerhardt, The Moneli Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and
Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539 (1989); Kramer &
Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT.
REv. 249; Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons From Tort Law and
Organization Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 1753 (1989); Snyder, The Final Authority Analysis: A
Unified Approach to Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 633; Whitman,
Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. Rv. 225 (1986).
258. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); City of Canton v. Harris,
109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
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emerging picture is not a terribly encouraging one for plaintiffs. Monell
made clear that municipalities are not liable for the wrongs of their em-
ployees under a theory of respondeat superior. 259 Instead, municipalities are
liable only for the wrongful acts they authorize. 260 No immunity exists when
a municipality has officially directed challenged conduct. But formal liability
is relatively unimportant in such cases, because municipalities would likely
pick up the tab for damages even if not liable themselves. 26 A more
significant consequence of exposure under the statute occurs in some damage
cases where municipalities unsuccessfully seek to distance themselves from
the conduct of their employees. 262 However, the prospect of recovery in
such cases has been uncertain. 263
The thrust of the extensive criticism of current law is that, along with
the qualified immunity enjoyed by individual local and state officials, the
limited exposure of municipalities to liability blocks much of what should
be the effective reach of section 1983.2 64 This suggests that a measure of
damage immunity for states accompanying an opposite result in Will would
have made uncertain the federal law enforcement advantages sought by
making states persons under section 1983. Two final points make this seem
even more likely. First, state immunity doctrine under section 1983 would
probably have been greater than municipal immunity. The Court has at-
tached significance to the condition of the immunities law at the time
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ,265 and one finds considerable
support for the view argued by the majority in Will and in Quern v.
259. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
260. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985), reh'g denied,
473 U.S.. 925 (1985) ("Monell teaches that the city may only be held accountable if the
deprivation was the result of municipal 'custom or policy."'); cf. Rudovsky, supra note 252,
at 34-35 (Monell and other cases "expressly condition liability under § 1983 on the factor of
governmental authorization."). Commentators have noted that this greatly limits the damage
exposure of municipalities under § 1983. E.g., Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability:
The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C.L. RPv. 518 (1987); Comment,
Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. Cm. L.
REv. 935 (1979).
261. Even if municipalities were not "person[s]" under the statute, they would probably
indemnify recoveries against their employees sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities,
since the employees would have incurred liability merely by "implementing official policy."
P. Low & J. JEFFRms, supra note 253, at 79.
262. E.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Owen, 445 U.S. at 622.
263. Frequently the problem is in finding a single actor who is both involved in the
commission of the alleged wrong and in a position within the municipal structure to be
regarded as a policy maker. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, provides an example. See generally Oliver,
Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 After City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 64 WAsH. U.L.Q. 151 (1986).
264. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 257; Mead, supra note 260; Rudovsky, supra note 252;
Schuck, supra note 257; Snyder, supra note 257; Whitman, supra note 257; Comment, supra
note 260; cf. Rudovsky, supra note 252, at 35-36 ("Qualified immunity has emerged as one
of the most significant and problematic defenses to claims of civil rights violations.").
265. See supra note 252.
[Vol. 66:1
1990] PRAGMATISM AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 47
Jordan2 that state immunity at that time was a more vigorous doctrine.2 67
Second, recall that legal arguments over the reach of state immunity to
damages will take place before state judges who may well be tempted to
avoid the "anomaly" of rendering damage judgments against their states
when federal judges would not.2 s
3. How Much Real Difference? Pragmatism as a
Form of Mediation in Will
This discussion opened with the assumption that either of the results
prefigured by the conflicting political interpretations of section 1983 in Will
could be achieved, and that the pragmatist concern was whether one of the
results seemed more likely to promote coherence. As discussion of the results
in application progressed, however, an additional possibility emerged. Un-
certainty attending applications of the dissent's version of section 1983
might have led to results barely different from those likely to follow under
the majority's reading. This illustrates how pragmatism may bear differently,
moderating the conflict by demonstrating that strong political differences
in theory fail to lead to commensurately different effects in statutory
application. 269
A comparison of the results which might have followed the dissent's
interpretation of section 1983 with those that have followed the majority's
interpretation suggests far less difference than one might have expected
from reading the Will opinions. Without suggesting that the balance between
federal law enforcement and federalism (if such could be precisely measured)
would rest at the same point under either approach, a fair pragmatist
question would be: is the real difference between where the balance would
rest worth the dissonance generated by the Will opinions?
True, the interpretation sought by the dissent in Will, that states are
persons under section 1983, would encourage more claims under the statute
in state courts. Yet significantly greater federal law enforcement (the
dissent's objective) would depend upon a favorable resolution of two
additional issues: mandatory state jurisdiction over section 1983 cases, and
266. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
267. Cf. Owen, 445 U.S. at 622, 638-47 (reviewing the relative weakness of municipal
immunity doctrine when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
268. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. On the other hand, states and state officers
probably would have been exposed to some measure of increased damage liability had the
dissent's interpretation of § 1983 prevailed. Professor Steinglass has suggested the possibility
of a different result in cases like Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where states act in
direct and formal noncompliance with federal law. Telephone conversation with Professor
Steinglass, Professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University (Aug.
29, 1990).
269. On the function of pragmatism in this setting, see supra notes 206-09 and accompanying
text.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
minimal immunity for states under the statute. 270 It is far from certain when
these points would be settled, and whether they would be settled in favor
of section 1983 plaintiffs. It is therefore difficult to say that opportunities
for section 1983 litigation in state courts would have been significantly
greater under the dissent's interpretation of the statute in Will than under
the majority's interpretation.
D. Symmetries of Access: Pragmatism Supplementing
Politics in Will
Influences of ordinary common sense are deeply embedded within our
judicial tradition.27' The result-bound approach of pragmatist legal theory,
then, does not offer entirely novel ways of considering Will or other cases. 272
A question in this Article persists: how and where does pragmatism fit?
Can it claim the same stature and resonance in statutory interpretation as
intentionalism, plain meaning and political interpretation? Much of the
problem in aligning pragmatism with the other three perspectives is that the
other three are substantively normative, while pragmatism is not.273 That is,
intentionalism, 274 plain meaning275 and political interpretation 276 each reflect
theories of value for why statutes require members of society to behave a
certain way. It may seem easier to make interpretive arguments entirely
within this dimension of substantive normativism. The argument, for ex-
ample, could be between justice conceived by a particular group of legislators
(intentionalism) or justice conceived by judges presented with the statute
(political interpretation). Or the situation could be like that in Will, where
the Justices ultimately align their arguments around opposite poles of
political interpretation.277
Yet just as different substantive perspectives can interact to influence
interpretation, so can pragmatism interact with substantive perspectives. The
former can be illustrated by the fact that judges are more likely to read
statutes in a way comporting with their own sense of justice (political
interpretation) if that reading is not out of harmony with the plain meaning
of the text, or with existing evidence of actual legislative intent.278 Will
offered two illustrations of the latter. The first assumed that the dissent's
270. See supra notes 219-67 and accompanying text.
271. See G. GmmuoRE, supra note 65, at 17; D. Gjerdingen, The Role of Common Sense in
Classical Legal Thought (1988) (copy of unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
272. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 32 & 92 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
278. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 322-23 (describing how in "easy cases"
support by different perspectives can be "mutually reinforcing").
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reading worked, significantly enhancing federal law enforcement opportu-
nities in state courts. The second assumed that it did not.
First, to suggest that the pragmatist concerns raised in Part III(C)(2)
above are immaterial to the dissent's political argument in Will would be
to say the degree of law's coherence is immaterial, so long as obstacles of
federalism will give way to greater federal law enforcement. Those who feel
strongly about the importance of federal substantive rights and who are
dissatisfied overall with opportunities for their vindication of course want
change. However, such persons who act responsibly will not automatically
support every proposal that facilitates greater federal law enforcement. They
will be selective, weighing particular reforms against instrumental costs to
the stature of the judicial process or clarity of the law. They will be most
likely to act on their political impulses when they can do so in harmony
with such pragmatist concerns.
Second, to suggest that the pragmatist concerns raised in Part III(C)(3)
above are immaterial to the dissent's political argument in Will would be
to say that whether the opposed readings of the statute would have caused
significant differences in application was immaterial, because to dissent
would in any event provide the Justices an opportunity to express their
distaste over what they regarded to be the exaggerated importance of
federalism generally.279 It seems likely that, among commentators, the public
at large and perhaps the Justices themselves, many are now weary of the
Supreme Court's emphasis on and dissension about politics. No one familiar
with our system of government believes that politics can or should be
banished from the Court. At the same time, the Supreme Court functions
more awkwardly in the political spotlight than does Congress, 2 0 and many
rightly believe that the Court should distance itself from political controversy
when possible.2 1 Pragmatism fits here by revealing that less in fact turns
on which definition of "person" is accepted, and by making avoidance of
political conflict for its own sake an instrumental goal. The latter helps to
scale down the political side of the Court's image and to avoid -an over-
worked, needlessly dissonant use of political interpretation in reading section
1983.
It may be that these matters cannot be stated so openly in a judicial
opinion without creating a certain awkwardness. Yet I doubt that incor-
porating these or other advertently pragmatist concerns would be any more
279. Apart from whatever harm Will might do to state court access for § 1983 plaintiffs,
the dissent was clearly upset to see aspects of eleventh amendment doctrine which it so
thoroughly disliked, see supra note 225, given additional life. See supra note 17 and accom-
panying text.
280. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
281. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-16 (1962). But see supra note
137 (highlighting the writings of Beerman and Spann).
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awkward than candid recognition of vying political arguments would have
been in Will. It may be more difficult for the Justices to be candid when
(as in Will) plain meaning and intentionalist approaches prove sterile. Yet
it is still best for members of the Court to be honest to the public about
what they want to do and why.282 I have tried to show in this Article that
the Justices have more than political choices left to talk about in such
cases, that they also have legal pragmatism to shape the content and enhance
the stature of their decisions.
IV. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON PRAGMATISM IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This Article maintains that, not only is pragmatism useful in statutory
interpretation, but pragmatism's theoretical base and means of application
entitle it to a place within the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation with
intentionalism (a variant of historical jurisprudence), plain meaning (a form
of analytical positivism) and political interpretation (a reflection of natural
law). There may be many angles from which this thesis might be attacked.
Here are two.
The first criticism could be that the thesis is at best too theoretical and
at worst antithetical to pragmatism-that we should keep the first three
approaches to statutory interpretation off jurisprudential pedestals rather
than erect a fourth for pragmatism. Some support for this criticism may
be found in an interesting recent article. 283 William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey identified three perspectives in statutory interpretation similar overall
to the three first discussed in this Article.214 At perhaps our most important
point of agreement, the authors argue for a flexible, pluralist outlook in
cases where approaches suggest conflicting answers, what Eskridge and
Frickey call "the hard cases. ' 285 Here the authors decry the tendency of
the Supreme Court in such cases to retreat into a single perspective, what
they call a "foundationalist" approach. 28 6
282. See Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HAiv. L. REv. 731 (1987).
283. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43.
284. Two were essentially the same as two discussed here, intentionalism and textualism
(textualism is the equivalent of plain meaning, see supra note 28). Their third, "purposivism,"
is narrower than the model of political interpretation offered here. Compare Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 43, at 332-38 with political interpretation, supra notes 35-41 and accom-
panying text. Part of what is in my third category (but apparently not theirs) is what the
authors revere as dynamic statutory interpretation. See supra note 35.
285. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 323.
286. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43, at 324-25. "The demise of foundationalism, the
attempt to find an indubitable ground for claims to knowledge and truths has been both
charted and heralded." Patterson, supra note 140, at 937. For further discussion of attacks
on foundationalism, see Farber, supra note 140, at 1334-41.
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Thereafter, however, we disagree. Eskridge and Frickey.argue that the
only way to avoid hard-case foundationalism is to deflate the traditional
perspectives (what they call "grand theories"). 28 7 Thus, my search for a
theoretical justification or jurisprudential understanding of these perspectives
might seem to them pointless labor. On the other hand, I have tried to
suggest why a search for the full value of legal pragmatism requires an
attempt to understand rather than to debunk nonpragmatist theories. The
vitality of nonpragmatist theories is important to the vitality of pragmatism,
since what sustains and makes important applications of, pragmatism ex-
plored in this Article is interaction with nonpragmatist theories.
In contrast, Eskridge and Frickey attempt to use pragmatism to demon-
strate how the legal order that gave us grand theories is becoming unstuck.
This seems to be an impoverished form of pragmatism, certainly not one
sustained by the optimistic view of society held by William James2 8 and
John Dewey.2 9 It is difficult to accept the suggestion implicit in their article
that Eskridge and Frickey have pushed pragmatism to its limits as useful
legal theory. It is worth exploring whether freestanding pragmatist theory
can be more than a weapon for cutting big ideas down to size, whether it
might also have a more active and affirmative side. The authors are right
in giving pragmatist theory at least some life of its own. Their error may
be that, in using pragmatism as a leveling device, they have leveled prag-
matism as well. To investigate the possibility of affirmative pragmatism, we
must see if pragmatism can be understood through (or as) jurisprudence.
That in turn requires some attention to nonpragmatist elements within a
larger jurisprudential community in order to place pragmatism in context.
A second criticism of my thesis could be that, in the final analysis, there
is just not enough system or substance to pragmatism for it to be on a
287. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 43. Eskridge and Frickey argue that what they call
grand theories (intentionalism, textualism and purposivism) may engage the interest of the
Supreme Court but have little influence on how most lawyers think and what most judges do
in fact. Id. at 321. The authors suggest that grand theories are for the Supreme Court a kind
of attractive nuisance leading it toward foundationalism. Id. at 322 ("failure to recognize that
statutory interpretation will work in different ways in different concrete cases").
288. Perry wrote of James: "He had uncompromising convictions and an unusual power
both of advocacy and of denunciation, but so strong was his humanity that nothing aroused
real hostility in him-except inhumanity." I R. PERRY, supra note 151, at 122. "James was
not given to climbing onto soapboxes, but his moral thought was activistic, as is clear from
his lectures, teaching, writing, friendships, and activities supporting social change." G. MYEss,
supra note 145, at 424.
289. Dewey was a strong humanist with a lifelong belief in the capacity for progress of a
democratic society. "Democracy" was to him "a reflective faith in the capacity of all human
beings for intelligent judgment, deliberation, and action if the proper conditions are furnished."
Bernstein, Dewey, Democracy: The Task Ahead of Us, in PosT-ANALxTic PEUiosoPHY 48, 49
(J. Rajchman'& C. West eds. 1985); see also J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATiONAL SocmTY 69(J. Shapiro trans. 1970); S. HOOK, JoiN DEwEY: AN INTELLECTUAL PoRTRArr 226-39 (1939);
H. Putnam, supra note 176.
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plane with the other three approaches to statutory interpretation, perhaps
not even enough to consider it as independent legal theory. I have more
sympathy for this criticism. Readers might find helpful the pragmatist
insights attempted in this Article about Will and statutory interpretation,
yet remain unconvinced that pragmatist theory offers material for a fully
distinct approach to statutory interpretation. Similarly, they may see little
useful difference between pragmatism as a fourth approach and pragmatism
as a value built into each of the three traditional approaches to statutory
interpretation. My suggestions to the contrary are merely exploratory. I do
believe, however, that pragmatism offers something tangible and affirming
for legal theory, something beyond ad hoc appeals to practicality. The
project of building something more out of pragmatism is a useful one which
undoubtedly will continue. James and Dewey might have liked that.
